


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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY
OF CENSORSHIP IN COMBAT ZONES



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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY
OF CENSORSHIP IN COMBAT ZONES.

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
J. E. LONGHOFFER, MAJ, USA
B.A., Sacramento State College, 1966
M.A., San Jose State College, 1969

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate J. E. Longhofer, MAJ, USA

Title of thesis An Analysis of the Psychological
Necessity of Censorship in Combat Zones

Approved by:

_____, Research and Thesis Advisor

_____, Member, Graduate Research Faculty

_____, Member, Graduate Research Faculty

Date: _____

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

↓ The primary purpose of this study was to examine the historical evolution of news censorship in the United States, the current military information policy in Vietnam, and media performance in reporting selected crisis combat events of the Vietnam conflict to determine the necessity of censorship in the area of combat operations during periods of low intensity warfare. A secondary purpose was to explore the psychological effects of established media performance on the national will to persist in this form of conflict.

A content analysis was conducted of two combat actions, the Tet Offensive and Ap Bia Mountain (commonly referred to as Hamburger Hill), as reported in The New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and The Kansas City Star. First, the three criticisms of position reporting, uninformed reporting, and erroneous reporting, as indicated in previous research, were noted, and criteria within these areas were then postulated in an attempt to systematically analyze the news content. This intuitive formulation of criteria for analysis was necessary because there is at

present no scientific model for news analysis and the critical need for investigation of this area, despite the dangers inherent in the attempt, demanded an immediate effort without waiting for the precision contained in the classical experimental design.

Results of the content analysis indicated a significant amount of position reporting (assuming a prior position and then reporting or putting undue stress and emphasis on only those events that support that position) in the three newspapers examined. Each newspaper, in varying degrees, engaged in position reporting of the Tet Offensive, 30 January 1968 through 14 February 1968, and the battle of Ap Bia Mountain, 19-29 May 1969. There were, as determined by this study, no cases of uninformed or erroneous reporting during these two periods.

Further, the effect of this performance on the national will to persist in low intensity warfare was considered by postulating inadequate socialization and peer group pressures in causal relationships with the media's behavioral reinforcing capabilities. Solid experimental evidence of mass group effect, however, was lacking, and, consequently, no firm conclusions were possible in this area.

In considering the establishing of censorship,

further study of all media forms in an expanded view of additional combat events is necessary before full field press censorship can be considered. Strong emphasis in future studies must be given to refining and strengthening the criteria utilized. In an area of investigation where the methods of analysis may be questionable, it is essential that the criteria be closely examined for validity.

The value of this study is in the finding, per the criteria established, that the selected newspapers have engaged in position reporting. Without question, further study is critically needed in the area of scientific models for news analysis whereby evaluative criteria become standard for both the journalistic profession and the layman. This subjective area, which has a tremendous potential in the formulation of public opinion, demands a scientific approach because of its possible reinforcing effect on the national will to persist in pursuit of vital national interests during the conduct of low intensity warfare.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to those officers and men of Troop B, 7th Armored Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, United States Army, who did their duty in unknown foreign places and will not return.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Gratitude is extended to Lieutenant Colonel Samuel R. Shalala, Research and Thesis Advisor, and to Lieutenant Colonel Darrell O. McNeil and Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Main, both members of the Graduate Research Faculty, without whose generous guidance this thesis could not have been completed.

My special thanks go to Colonel Shalala, who acted in the truest sense as advisor in this endeavor.

J. E. L.

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SELECTED COMMENTS EXPRESSING ATTITUDES
ON NECESSITY OF MEDIA CONTROL

"To the future or to the past, to a time when thought is free, when men are different from one another and do not live alone--to a time when truth exists and what is done cannot be undone: From the age of uniformity, from the age of doublethink--greetings!"

--George Orwell, 1984

"What does it matter how strong the concrete is, so long as the will is weak!"

--Adolf Hitler, German Reich Chancellor

"This is a people's war, and to win it the people should know as much about it as they can."

--Elmer Davis, The Press and America

"If you were defeated, you were defeated by yourselves."

--General Vo Nguyen Giap
Commander in Chief
Peoples Army, North Vietnam

". . . [T]he mass communications of this country probably have more effect on the American mind than all the schools and universities combined, and the problem is that neither the officials who run the government nor the officials who run the newspapers, nor the radio and television news programs, have adjusted to that fact."

--James Reston, The Artillery of the Press

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

--First Amendment to Constitution
of the United States of America

The Vietnam conflict is the first war in the history of the United States in which the public has been admitted, via the communications media, to the battlefield. It has also gained the dubious distinction of becoming America's longest, most debated, and indecisive war--indecisive to the point of defeat. Obviously, many factors may be responsible for the indecision, but a question immediately posed is: In what manner or degree, if any, have the communications media contributed to this course of events? This study examines this critical area in order to explore the contribution of the media and, also, the need for governmental restrictions in the reporting of low intensity warfare.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study was to examine the historical evolution of news censorship in the United States, the current military information policy in Vietnam, and media performance in reporting selected crisis combat events of the Vietnam conflict to determine the necessity of establishing censorship on the media in the area of combat operations during periods of low intensity warfare. Without question, the people of the United States must have unbiased facts and a balanced view of the events of the day if they are to evaluate properly the world situation. Therefore, a series of assumptions, often stated and considered to be basic ideals of the American society,¹ are listed as a starting point in an examination of the necessity of censorship:

1. An enlightened public is necessary for a sensible foreign policy.
2. If the public is to be enlightened, the communications media must have the fullest possible access to the

¹Harold D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1950), p. 157.

news.

3. The communications media perform a critical function in America's society by presenting a balanced view of the news.

4. Full disclosure of the news during periods of national emergency may not be in the national interest.

A fifth assumption which may become required by contemporary events is that censorship in combat zones is a basic requirement of low intensity warfare.

NEED FOR INVESTIGATION

Some would dispute use of the term "defeat" in describing United States Vietnam involvement and the current decision to terminate that involvement through "Vietnamization."² Indeed, the public is counseled by respected members of the academic community, in popular news publications, that the terms "victory" and "defeat" are outmoded and the American people must come to accept inconclusive foreign policy in the future.

²Concept by which Vietnamese Armed Forces will assume ever-increasing responsibility for combat actions, thereby releasing United States combat forces.

Stanley Hoffman, a professor of government at Harvard and a former colleague of Henry Kissinger, has stated:

American foreign policy needs a new stance and some new conceptions. As the new administration seems to have understood, the policies of the past have all brought us to dead ends. Vietnam has provoked a trauma here at home. . . .

We have not yet grasped a basic truth about the world: that all states are more capable of frustrating each others' dreams than of realizing their own, better at preserving the status quo than at altering it substantially in their favor. . . .

For two decades, we have based our foreign policy on two notions. One was the idea that world Communism must be contained, and the other was that America's mission was to preserve--single-handedly, if necessary--world order everywhere. These notions have now become useless: worse, they are dangerous. . . .

The anti-Communist imperative is of little use when the forces on our side are unable to establish a legitimate and effective government, or when the other side has a strong national appeal and superior organization. It does not work when the fear of escalation limits our use of military power at the point where pursuit of victory would mean both an enlarged war and the destruction of the people we are supposed to be protecting. . . . Nor will we ever achieve a moderate and manageable system of world order unless we accept the fact that occasionally violent internal and social upheavals abroad are inevitable and cannot be stopped or thwarted by us.³

Mead called for a reasonable view of Vietnam when

³Stanley Hoffman, "Policy for the 70's," Life, 21 March 1969, pp. 68-70.

she said:

. . . we continue to argue about the outcome in the old vocabulary of victory and defeat. . . . I believe we have confused defeat and error. . . . If we can learn from Vietnam that the day of "little" wars, no less than major wars, is past, carrying with them neither victory nor defeat, we can perhaps take the next step. . . . It is significant that all our errors have been military and our successes have been economic and social.⁴

Kahn, in proposing a change in how the United States should view future relations with the Soviet Union, wrote:

What all this adds up to is not a renewed cold-war rivalry of the sort that we had between 1945 and 1955, nor a serious entente, nor, certainly, a cultural and political convergence of the two societies. Rather, the prognosis is for a detente, with a certain "growing apart" of the two societies, a certain lack of interest in each other's affairs.⁵

Life published the pictures of 242 American soldiers killed in action during the week of 28 May through 3 June 1969. The avowed purpose of the feature was to allow the American people to see "faces" rather than to hear "numbers."⁶

⁴Margaret Mead, "A Reasonable View of Vietnam," Redbook, February 1970, pp. 48-50.

⁵Herman Kahn, "How To Think About the Russians," Fortune, November 1968, p. 248.

⁶"Vietnam: One Week's Dead, May 28, 1969 - June 3, 1969," Life, 26 June 1969, pp. 20-32.

Thus, in the view of these popular mass publications, the people may become prepared mentally for compromise as the natural order of future events. One may conclude that a psychology of compromise is being fostered in this society, a central point discussed in Chapter V.

The determination of foreign policy is the responsibility of the President and the Department of State. However, this determination, in the final analysis, is a reflection of the public will to support that policy. This inquiry explores one variable that conditions the "national will" and does not dispute in any manner the President's decisions or actions in the area of foreign policy. In fact, the concept of Vietnamization (if coupled with a psychological offensive to fill the vacuum created by United States withdrawal) is a proper step in defeating the Communists. Foreign troops, a last resort in the conduct of internal defense, should be withdrawn as soon as the host government is capable of providing security for its people. A premature withdrawal, on the other hand, could be disastrous.

Regardless of terminology (realignment of effort or defeat), the impact of United States actions in Vietnam, if

not successful, will be one of profound influence on her destiny. This impact, if it can be limited to the Vietnam experience, will be sufficient to alter the political fabric of the United States, but this may be survived. The critical danger is to relationships with allied nations (both actual and potential) and, most significantly, with adversaries who may incorrectly evaluate American resolve and attempt to capitalize on the situation by continuing to initiate "wars of national liberation."

The rebellious young of America's society (highly idealistic, perhaps as a result of few economic concerns) have made much of the constant nuclear threat under which they have existed in extreme tension since 1945. Few, in their unrealistic call for total peace, consider that nuclear parity and the desire of the superpowers to avoid a nuclear exchange have, in fact, decreased the possibility of general war, that is, "armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy."⁷ A general war, without massive nuclear

⁷Department of the Army, AR 310-25, Directory of United States Army Terms (March 1969), p. 203.

exchange, is also not desired by the superpowers due to the dangers of inadvertent escalation. How, then, will a nation achieve its aims if general war with nuclear exchange is unacceptable and limited war has undue risks? Trinquier has stated:

Since the end of World War II, a new form of warfare has been born. Called at times either subversive warfare or revolutionary warfare, it differs fundamentally from the wars of the past in that victory is not expected from the clash of two armies on a field of battle. This confrontation, which in times past saw the annihilation of an enemy army in one or more battles, no longer occurs.

Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions--political, economic, psychological, military--that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.⁸

It appears, within the nuclear context, that guerilla warfare may be the only acceptable form of warfare remaining and, therefore, a threat to America's vital interests, of which the ultimate is national survival. Unfortunately, in a democratic society, it is often difficult to reach agreement on what constitutes a threat to national survival, or even what should be considered vital interests.

⁸ Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counter-Insurgency (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 6.

Osgood, in a text produced under the auspices of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy, University of Chicago, commented thus on self-interest:

Among the ends of national self-interest, survival, of course, must be rated the most compelling. However, this is an end that commands active attention only when it is joined by the catalyst of fear, as when the nation perceives a clear threat to its self-preservation. Therefore, a nation may not always, in concrete situations, take into account the full value of its survival, which in any theoretical scale of values it would unquestionably award top priority. This becomes an important consideration in the case of the United States, whose relative physical isolation, almost up to World War II, encouraged a complacency toward its security permitted to few other nations.⁹

The people of the United States support the current reduction of conventional military force with an apparent return, per the Nixon Doctrine of January 1970, to reliance on the nuclear shield of the 1950's. This, coupled with a growing isolationism which is resulting from lack of a clear threat to this nation and the fact that nuclear conflict is the least probable form of conflict, may result in catastrophe. Halperin noted:

Another outgrowth of this situation is a general indifference to, or in some cases opposition to, the

⁹Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 15.

buildup of indigenous conventional capability, on the grounds that it is at best superfluous and economically wasteful in a period in which economic growth is a critical variable. . . . The emphasis on the adequacy and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence can only serve to cast doubt on the credibility and effectiveness of the United States' conventional forces, especially as the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent declines with the growth of Chinese nuclear power. The obvious results would be pressure for independent national nuclear forces and a weakening of the desire for, and the belief in, the efficacy of both indigenous and American conventional defense efforts. . . . American nuclear power will continue to be a vital element in defending the Far East; but it is not now, nor will it be in the future, a substitute for conventional forces.¹⁰

How, then, will the United States, on the strength of nuclear reliance, deal with aggressive "tigers" of the world despite denials of their existence by the liberal community? If she relies excessively on nuclear weapons, her options may reduce to total nuclear conflict or humiliation as the "tigers" proceed in their conduct of revolutionary warfare. Those who believe no problem exists, Margaret Mead notwithstanding, are referred to Nikita S. Khrushchev's speech of 6 January 1961, in which he stated the Communists would avoid nuclear war but there would be "liberation wars

¹⁰Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 133-34.

as long as imperialism exists."¹¹ Liberal critics will insist, correctly to some degree, that a decade has forced a change in Soviet policy, especially in light of their current economic problems. However, no other form of warfare can be supported with a lesser investment of resources and revolutionary warfare, if the United States allows it to be successful, could become an ideal alternative for Communists in the pursuit of their vital interests.

The Chinese Communists have also commented on this mode of warfare. Lin Piao, in a speech 3 September 1965, advocated "people's wars" in which guerrilla warfare is to be preferred over conventional warfare. He recommended the strategy of retreat into the countryside, a protracted war that would tie down large United States forces, and, after gaining military and political superiority, storming the cities for final victory. In this statement of policy, Lin Piao equated the underdeveloped countries of the world as the "countryside" and the industrialized nations as the "cities."¹²

¹¹"The Many Voices of K[hruhshchev]," Newsweek, 30 January 1961, p. 35.

¹²Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's

Therefore, if the current trend continues, conventional forces will remain available with reduced strengths, reduced funds for weapons development, and a reduced capability to deal with the existing emergency. As has happened too frequently in United States national history, a few will then pay the ultimate price for the convenience and comfort of many. This will become even more distasteful as the nation moves toward a small "Volunteer Army" in which the citizen will limit his national defense contribution to dollars instead of personal sacrifice. Fehrenbach, writing of Korea and the future, stated it well in these words:

Less than a year after fighting ended in Korea, Vietnam was lost to the West, largely because of the complete repugnance of Americans toward committing a quarter of a million ground troops in another apparently indecisive skirmish with Communism. Even more important, the United States, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported, simply did not have the troops.

.....

The United States will be forced to fight wars of policy during the balance of the century. This is inevitable, since the world is seething with disaffection and revolt, which, however justified and merited, plays into Communist hands, and swings the world balance ever their way. Military force alone cannot possibly solve the problem--but without the application of some military force certain areas, such as Southeast Asia,

will inevitably be lost.

.....

We can lose the game not only because of the nature of our enemies, but because of our own. We understand we cannot ignore the competition, and realize with frustration that we cannot end it by putting our competitor out of business with a bang, but we will not willingly face the fact that we may walk along the chasm, beset by tigers, for many years to come.

There will be more threats in fringe areas, like Korea, because Communist doctrine demands them. Here ends and even morality will be vague. There will be no cheap, easy, or popular answers to these threats. We may have the choice of limited, controlled violence for temporary ends--or of blowing the whistle on the game--and with the game, possibly mankind.

The enemy is no superman, as was proven on Pork Chop Hill. Anything he can do, we can do better--if we have the will [italics not in the original].

.....

It was time for free, decent societies to continue to control their military forces, but to quit demanding from them impossible acquiescence in the liberal view toward life. A "modern" infantry may ride sky vehicles into combat, fire and sense its weapons through instrumentations, employ devices of frightening lethality in the future--but it must also be old-fashioned enough to be iron-hard, poised for instant obedience, and prepared to die in the mud.

If liberal, decent societies cannot discipline themselves to do all these things, they may have nothing to offer the world. They may not last long enough.¹³

¹³T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: Korea, A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan Company,

In this writer's opinion, a military force "old-fashioned enough to be iron-hard, poised for instant obedience, and prepared to die in the mud" is a far cry from a recent congressional proposal in which drafted military personnel would be exempt from service in combat zones and only volunteers would serve and face the dangers of combat. One can only wonder how long, with only financial inducement, the volunteers would continue to make this questionable bargain. A small Regular Army--Volunteer Army, to utilize terminology of the future--will fight the limited wars or, in the last resort, will purchase time for lives while the United States prepares for conventional war. How eroded is the will when the elite will pay for others to serve and die?

Twenty-five years of relative peace have elapsed due to United States nuclear capability and the blood of her citizens during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The account may soon become overdrawn, and one questions whether this nation will have the resolve to make the required deposit. The Hanoi Government thinks not and intends to

outwait American resolve in Vietnam. In this connection, Edmund A. Gullion, Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, made the following statement:

While Hanoi broadcasts its thanks to the Americans who march in protest against the war, there are other Americans who see the repetition of a grim and familiar pattern. Hanoi moves by the same calculations which paid off for it in the defeat of the French in 1954.

As the late Ho Chi Minh once told the French: "You will kill ten of our men and we will kill one of yours. And in the end, it will be you who will tire of it." French power was shaken but not shattered by the defeat at Dienbienphu. What broke France was the collapse of will on the home front. The French were fighting to preserve a hold in Vietnam. The Americans fight to preserve the right of the South Vietnamese--the vast majority of whom fear and reject Hanoi--to choose and live by their own government. But North Vietnam, having seen one Western power worn down by sapping tactics on the home front, is sure the same strategy will pay off again. Indeed, this is what the declarations in the Hanoi press and radio are all about.

In Vietnam today, the enemy grows weaker as our side grows stronger. The situation is still precarious but President Nixon's Vietnamization plan shows real signs of working. The bitter paradox is that Hanoi grows more resolute as American will seems to waver here at home. (This would appear to be wishful thinking on the part of Hanoi, in view of the recent Gallup poll and the resolution by the House of Representatives strongly supporting the President's plan.) If the enemy believes that public opinion will force an immediate American pullout, he has no reason to negotiate at Paris or anywhere else. So long as he believes the "peace-marchers" are marching not for peace but for him, he will carry on the fight, and more American and Vietnamese men will lose their

lives.¹⁴

The recent Gallup poll and the resolution by the House of Representatives may not indicate presidential support but may be the result of an overwhelming relief on the part of the American people that at last it appears the war is being terminated, whatever the manner.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, has commented on the possible effects of an immediate withdrawal on the American people. In response to a proposal from New York's Republican Senator Charles Goodell that all funds for the war be cut off on 1 December 1970, thereby forcing the President to withdraw all troops, it was indicated that such action could possibly initiate the collapse of the Saigon Government and require American forces to fight their way out of Vietnam. New York's senior Republican Senator, Jacob Javits, stated that if this occurred "the impact on the psychology of America would be incalculable."¹⁵ Needless to

¹⁴Edmund A. Gullion, "Why Hanoi Fights On," Reader's Digest, February 1970, p. 53.

¹⁵"This Week in Washington: Vietnam Fire Fades," National Observer, 9 February 1970, p. 2.

say, Senator Goodell's proposal was not supported. In this regard, Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, announced on 30 April 1970 that the United States would attack beyond the Cambodian border in pursuit of Communist forces for the purpose of destroying enemy base areas. The President stated further that he would act in the best interests of the nation regardless of effect on the Republican Party or on his own chances for a second term in 1972.

The American people seem little aware of the tremendous emphasis the Communist world places on psychological warfare. Frank R. Barnett, President, National Strategy Information Center, New York City, and internationally known expert on Communist strategy, stated:

In the Soviet Union, in the field of propaganda and political warfare, there are about ten West Points, two Fort Leavenworths, two Army War Colleges and a National War College; all in the field of ideology, propaganda, and political warfare. Now, you name me the school in the United States, or for that matter in the entire Western world, which is the equivalent of the Lenin Institute of Political Warfare. And don't tell me Fort Bragg. I've been down to Fort Bragg. I am impressed with the motivation and the dedication and everything else--the physical conditioning of these bright young officers. I think they are absolutely terrific. And maybe they are very good at counter guerrilla warfare, but when they take a couple of first lieutenants and tell them how to write leaflets which are stuffed into some sort of a shell and fired out over the enemy and they call that political warfare! Please. Please!

The Soviet Union is training, and continues to train, literally thousands of professional political warriors, and the course at one of those institutes lasts for two years. And what do they study? Pavlovian psychology, the techniques developed by Dr. Goebbels, who was Hitler's evil genius of propaganda. . . . They are mining the whole arsenal of the behavioral sciences for political and propaganda warfare techniques.

Now this country knows something about cooperation between the military and the physical sciences. We do a lot of that. We have plenty of chemists, physicists, mathematicians, and economists working with the Pentagon, the RAND [Research and Development] Corporation, the Institute for Defense Analysis, and so on. We know virtually nothing about marrying the behavioral sciences to the Department of State. And yet the Soviet Union has about a 3-decade lead time over us in this weapons system. And I think that instead of propaganda and political warfare becoming less important, they are going to become more important as decisionmakers, in the West particularly, will be more and more reluctant to go to firepower.¹⁶

The very word "propaganda" has negative connotations in America's society, which views it as an unethical attempt to influence the opinions of others and considers its full use appropriate only during full-scale warfare. And, even that full use is often fragmented and ineffective at best. Americans deal in words while the Soviets see psychological warfare as a continuous operation that meshes smoothly with

¹⁶ Frank R. Barnett, Address before students and faculty, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 26 January 1970. (USACGSC Library tape.)

political and military action. Schramm, writing on the Soviet concept of psychological warfare, stated:

If the Communists have discovered anything new, it is not the power of the word, but the power of a dedicated, disciplined, ruthless combat party. We risk dangerous misunderstanding if we try to interpret this kind of operation in terms of our own most-commonly-held folklore about psychological warfare, which enters all too often into our public print and legislative hearings. According to this folklore, our psychological warriors are a rather special group of individuals, probably not psychologists and certainly not warriors, who are permitted to throw words at the enemy while our real warriors are at lunch. As to whether they can accomplish anything, there is an extremely wide difference of opinion. One group holds that they are boondogglers and should be junked in favor of another battleship or bomb. Another group holds that they can take over and fight the cold war so effectively that it will be unnecessary to use the real warriors at all. We shall never understand the Soviet operations from the starting point of that folklore. For the Soviet concept is at once more realistic and more unified. In the Soviet mind there is no sharp separation between words and deeds, or between political warfare and military warfare. There is, rather, a concept of a party acting--using words and deeds in such patterns and combinations as are needed, in war or in peace, to further the class struggle. The road to understanding Soviet psychological warfare is therefore through an understanding of this combat party, its beliefs and goals, its world view, its organization, and its tactical doctrine. . . .¹⁷

¹⁷William E. Daugherty, in collaboration with Morris Janowitz, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-360, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 780, extracting Wilbur Schramm, "The Soviet Concept of 'Psychological' Warfare," in Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955), pp. 101-145.

No American organization exists which correlates psychological operations for internal and external target operations. Admiral Mahan, in his writings on sea power, produced a tremendous impact on professional and lay thought. America's society has "had no Mahan of diplomacy, economics, or propaganda."¹⁸ In fact, this concept of organization or individual is abhorrent to the American mind even though America faces a potential enemy who utilizes these methods to the utmost and takes extreme pride in their operation.

Furthermore, they are able to reward their agitators, propagandists, organizers and other "psychological troops," as we are not, by giving them status. Agitatsaya i propaganda are honorific words in Russia. They are honorific because the importance of these activities in the pattern of world revolution is recognized and respected. Because this is so, the "psychological troops" may be expected to have a sense of mission, a sense of playing on the first team, which our psychological warfare operators typically have not had. We need not imitate the Soviets, but we should be foolish not to recognize the operative strength of their structure. . . .

The point we have tried to make is, rather, that we are facing a combat party, skilled, able, disciplined, and dedicated, guided by a doctrine based on the philosophy of class struggle, which conceives of every group not dominated by the party as an enemy, and which

¹⁸Lasswell, p. 172.

permits of no solution to world tension until the Party dominates all other groups--or is destroyed. This Party uses words skillfully, but only as one weapon among many. Throughout the non-Soviet world it is engaged in tactics of indoctrination, organization, infiltration, maneuver, and seizure. Throughout the Soviet world it is engaged in consolidating its advances, combining coercion with persuasion, trying to create the new kind of Soviet citizen needed for the master blueprint. This paper has neither space nor mandate to discuss the counterattack which the program of the combat party seems to invite and require. But it is self-evident that the answer to a "total attack," such as that of the combat party, which recognizes only nominal and formal difference between war and nonwar, the answer to that kind of attack cannot be merely in words, or even mostly in words. . . .¹⁹

There should be little doubt that the United States is opposed by professionals who fully utilize their proficiency in psychology while attempting to influence United States public opinion and attitudes toward an isolation that will allow Communist exploitation.

The attitude (belief, judgment, opinion, and prejudice) construct is extensively treated in the field of social psychology in the attempt to understand and guide human behavior. In fact, there is probably no single concept within the whole realm of social psychology that

¹⁹ Daugherty, in collaboration with Janowitz, pp. 787-88, extracting Schramm.

occupies a more central position than that of attitude.²⁰

Man is an adaptable animal that can be manipulated, but the society of the United States apparently does not view this as a possible threat. It is postulated that the citizens of this country would deny, and in fact become incensed over, the suggestion that they have been psychologically manipulated by the North Vietnamese propaganda apparatus. Doctors J. B. Cooper and J. L. McGaugh, both social psychologists, state:

Man and many of the lower animals have modifiable neural equipment which is altered by experience. This is the dynamic aspect. Especially in the case of man, experience with an object modifies his neural equipment in such ways as to establish a "perform" or psychological set; and the very same equipment, under different conditions of experience, could have produced a very different set.²¹

There is no question that behavior may be altered to some degree by modification of attitudes through communications. There is vast research literature on the subject of attitude change, but a review or evaluation of it is beyond

²⁰G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, Experimental Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), p. 889.

²¹J. B. Cooper and J. L. McGaugh, Integrating Principles of Social Psychology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenckman Publishing Co., 1963), p. 236.

the scope of this study. Comment on specific communications experimentation is made in Chapter III. Suffice to note that the Soviet Union has the expertise (indeed an international reputation for the conditioning and modification of behavior) to utilize a constant low-keyed exposure of compromise.

Major James P. Cargile, Jr., a former commander of the 18th Psychological Operations Company (Airborne), while serving as a captain, hypothesized, since specific intelligence information does not exist or is not available, that a possible national objective of North Vietnam could be stated thus: "To remove or seriously hinder the American capability to block victory for the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam."²² Developing this objective, he then noted the following psychological objectives, with applicable target audiences and supporting propaganda themes:

Convince the South Vietnamese people that America's true purpose in South Vietnam is imperialism.

THEMES:

a. The American imperialists . . .

²²James P. Cargile, Jr., "Hanoi's Underestimated Weapon," Armor, September-October 1967, p. 23.

b. The South Vietnamese government is a stooge of American imperialism.

c. The Americans are no different from the French colonialists.

Create confusion and lower morale among the American people so that the American government will find it politically difficult to prosecute the war in South Vietnam.

THEMES:

a. The war in South Vietnam is unjust.

b. The bombing in the North is immoral.

c. The bombing in the North is ineffective.

d. The American government does not tell the truth about the war in Vietnam.

e. The United States is involved in a long war that it cannot win.

Create world opinion so adverse to the American position in South Vietnam that the United States may someday find it expedient to withdraw her forces.

THEMES:

a. The war in South Vietnam is truly a war of liberation.

b. Americans are imperialists and aggressors.

c. The American government does not tell the truth about the war in Vietnam.

d. American bombing in the North is immoral.

e. The Vietnamese peoples will fight forever

against American aggression.²³

Combine an extensive psychological program with the utilization of America's own media in order to present this program and one begins to appreciate the effectiveness potential of the presentation. Newsmen are not required to present the program with zeal and enthusiasm and, in fact, an extensive or obvious presentation is neither necessary nor desirable. A low-keyed exposure, with minimum information, is most effective. The amount of information as a factor in attitude change was considered in a study conducted by Cherrington in which 11 different groups were exposed by different methods to various amounts of information about international relations and the causes of war. Individual exposure varied from a single lecture to a summer in Geneva hearing international figures explain their views. Cherrington found that those exposed to the least instruction made the greatest attitude shifts.²⁴

Has the implication been made that Stanley Hoffman,

²³Cargile, "Hanoi's Underestimated Weapon," p. 23.

²⁴Cooper and McGaugh, p. 262, citing B. M. Cherrington, Methods of Education in International Attitudes, Teachers College Contribution to Education No. 595. Columbia University.

Margaret Mead, Herman Kahn, the editors of Life, and the news media are Communist, pro-Communist, or disloyal? If so, this was not intended. They have, however, repeated themes that undermine the national will. It is obvious that the most effective propaganda is propaganda that is not recognized as such. The measurement of effectiveness in this area is vague, but in all forms of the media the growing assault on the insidious military-industrial complex and its effect on United States domestic and foreign policy may be taken as an indicator. It is difficult to measure or recognize propaganda when the principles of effective propaganda are not known. One might consider how many American citizens, on all levels, could recite the following principles of propaganda taken from a basic text on government:

1. Make the appeal in terms of an existing need and, if none exists, try to create one. [Americans want and need peace so that national resources can be diverted to domestic projects.]

2. Take advantage of any feelings of confusion and offer a clear explanation or panacea. [Why are we in Vietnam? After all, we cannot be the policemen of the world.]

3. Make the explanation harmonize with established beliefs and attitudes. [Withdrawal will bring peace for America and any country can make a mistake.]

4. If a new proposal is made, orient it with a familiar object. [A volunteer army will allow each

citizen to serve in his own manner in the American tradition.]

5. Utilize the prestige of prominent people or popular support. [There is little need to list prominent Americans who oppose involvement in Vietnam. The ABM (antiballistic missile) dispute in 1969 was interesting in that Paul Newman, Dustin Hoffman, Tony Randall, Professor George Wald of Harvard, and others were quoted as being against the ABM on the basis that the system had not been proved and the money could best be spent in the social area. No experts--but certainly personalities.]

6. Make the most effective presentation possible. [Who could present it more effectively than America's own media?]

7. Fight other propaganda with one's own. [The North Vietnamese only want peace.]²⁵

Have these basic principles of propaganda, as part of the larger subject of psychological warfare, appeared in United States news media during the period of her Vietnam involvement? The answer is an unfortunate no as a critical subject remains unreported.

One must ask whether the threat to America's survival is sufficient to suggest any form of censorship. Traditionally, censorship has been tolerated only in the area of security. Harold D. Lasswell, Professor of Law, Yale

²⁵R. Wallace Brewster, Government in Modern Society, with Emphasis on American Institutions (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958), pp. 154-55.

University, listed those items he believes should be protected by censorship:

In general, it is agreed that proper censorship and police measures are needed to protect the following:

Technical details of new weapons.

Technology by which new weapons are manufactured.

Identity of the resources, facilities, and manpower going into new weapons, and amounts involved.

Information that specific surprise weapons are being worked on.

Specific plans of armed defense.

Precise news of the progress of treaty and agreement negotiations (when the parties so desire).

Identity of secret friends abroad.

Identity of our counteragents.

Information concerning allies of the categories that we protect in our own case.²⁶

This listing and the American ideal may have to be revised, in the contemporary world of psychological warfare, to include the area of the "national will." It goes without saying that when censorship, even in combat zones, is proposed, the situation must be carefully evaluated. Censorship, in whatever form or degree, is an extremely sensitive

²⁶Lasswell, p. 89.

subject in this society, and continual conflict between the citizen's right to know and military security has been the norm. The addition of "national will" to this debate will surely intensify the conflict between government and media. However, the dangers of censorship must be considered as an alternative to the dangers inherent in a continuing series of failures in any conflict except that of a total conventional war, in which the threat to survival is overwhelmingly obvious.

No claim, as noted earlier, is, or can be, made that the media have intentionally contributed to the "aid and comfort" of America's enemies. No conspiracy is implied; nor could the implication be defended. However, regardless of intent, they have obviously exerted influence (reference current events) as an absolute minimum by a failure to educate the public to the critical dangers of revolutionary and psychological warfare. Whose position is to be followed? Are the noble ideals of a free press compatible with the controls required to maintain the public support necessary to conduct successful military operations in low intensity warfare? This is a difficult question and one which has no easy answer. This study does not pretend to provide

the answer between idealism and realism. It does attempt to determine whether censorship in combat zones should be immediately established, as a matter of governmental regulation, whenever military forces are employed.

Without question, a complex interaction of variables has resulted in the current attempt at withdrawal from Vietnam. The purpose of this study is to examine only one variable: media presentation of combat events in three selected national newspapers. If it can be established that position reporting has occurred, this will be a first step in a further exploration of the political and psychological implications of this phenomenon. As noted previously, the intent of the contribution by the media to the North Vietnamese national effort is beyond the scope of this study. Despite their intent, it is critical that this area be investigated. As Barnett stated:

Either we will create for ourselves a healthy climate of opinion based on facts, or we may have American opinion manipulated for us by conflict managers who have learned from Pavlov, Goebbels, and Lenin on how to advance their goals through nonmilitary warfare. Indeed, if this country were ever pushed to the wall by Communism, the epitaph on our tombstone might read as follows:

Here lies the only civilization which perished at the peak of its power, with its power unused. Here lies a decent people who wanted love, not empire, and got

neither; who tried to trade power for popularity and lost both.

Here lies a nation of advertisers who knew how to change consumer tastes in cigarettes, but were themselves manipulated on all the issues that really mattered to their salvation and survival.

Here died a sort of Lancelot in the Court of Nations who, granting all his grievous flaws, was still somehow the noblest knight of all; except this Lancelot, crippled with an undeserved guilt complex, let his weapons and ideals fall unused, and so condemned all mankind to the Thousand-Year Night of the Russian Bear and the Chinese Dragon.²⁷

A Gallup poll conducted in December 1969 reported 45 per cent of the respondents indicated they believed newspapers "tend to favor one side" in presenting news on political and social questions. Distrust of the written and electronic media increased as a function of education. Fifty-three per cent of those with college training considered television news slanted, while 60 per cent felt that newspapers did not accurately report the news.²⁸ However, opinions of questionable performance of the media are not

²⁷ Frank R. Barnett, "Public Opinion: The Private Sector and National Defense," Peace and War in the Modern Age: Premises, Myths, and Realities, ed. F. R. Barnett, W. C. Mott, and J. C. Neff (Carden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), p. 418.

²⁸ "Divided Opinion," Newsweek, 19 January 1970, p. 59.

restricted to the layman, with even members of the profession having reservations. Doctor DeWayne B. Johnson, a professor of journalism at San Fernando Valley State College and a newspaper deskman of extensive experience, conducted an evaluation of the United States press by presenting 12 assertions concerning performance of the media in Vietnam to academicians and newsmen (see Appendix A). The professors rated the media unsatisfactory in six areas and the newsmen rated themselves unsatisfactory in four.²⁹ Experienced journalist Howard K. Smith has criticized today's journalists for their lack of perception and perspective in reporting the news.³⁰ Herman H. Dinsmore, a visiting professor of journalism at Long Island University and a former editor of the New York Times international edition, maintained the New York Times is living on its past reputation for journalistic integrity. His detailed and objective analysis illustrates the slanting of news in the Times thus:

²⁹ DeWayne B. Johnson, "Vietnam: Report Card on the Press Corps at War," Journalism Quarterly, Spring 1969, pp. 9-19.

³⁰ U.S., Congress, Senate, "Senator McGee Introduces the Howard K. Smith Column Entitled 'A Poorly Balanced Diet of Journalism' into the Record," 90th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, CXIV (20 February 1968), S1505.

The New York Times has been a depressant and a harmful factor in the Vietnam foreign policy of the United States, a policy that is not Democratic or Republican but bipartisan, with the backing of great majorities not only of both parties in the two houses of Congress but most of the public, if we may accept most of the polls.³¹

Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, in a speech 13 November 1969, found the television networks at fault for slanting the news, for premature analysis, and for the creation of issues and personalities. It is interesting that the immediate response of the media was to proclaim loud cries of imminent censorship coupled with the "rights" reserved to themselves.³²

The late John W. Burgess, an expert on constitutional law, interpreted freedom of speech and of the press to be that "the central government can infringe it neither by way of censorship or prevention nor by way of punishment for its use or abuse."³³ Burgess viewed freedom of speech

³¹H. H. Dinsmore, All The News That Fits (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1969), p. 251.

³²Editorial, "The Press Faces Its Critics," Life, 5 December 1969, p. 46.

³³John W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, Vol. I: Sovereignty and Liberty (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1890), p. 190.

and of the press not as a right but, except in the area of national security, as an immunity from governmental action. This opinion, which he expressed in 1890, continues today and is the focal point of the debate between media and government. Even military personnel assigned to communications duties in the Republic of Vietnam are claiming their right, immune from governmental control, to present the news as they see fit. Their responsibilities as soldiers to act in accordance with orders and in the best interests of the government are given second priority.

This continuing debate between media and government is a problem area that demands an immediate degree of resolution in the contemporary world. A crisis of communication may exist when the media command, as they do, tremendous influence on the public, while properly dealing in criticism on their editorial pages, yet react to criticism with cries of censorship rather than self-examination--self-examination such as they require of those they monitor. Mott, while conceding that journalists are willing to criticize themselves, further commented on the attitude of the media to criticism from outside the profession in these words:

. . . hypersensitiveness to all criticism (whether informed or superficial) continued to be all too evident

in both the print and the electronic media, and this defensive attitude sometimes neutralized the values of criticism.³⁴

IDENTIFICATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS

The general hypothesis of this study is: The present system for combat zone media control is inadequate in that news reports, with or without byline, have been seriously slanted against the war effort. If this hidden bias is established, censorship should be considered in future conflicts. The existing system in Vietnam has accomplished, in most cases, its stipulated mission of preventing the compromise of security information. However, low intensity warfare conducted as a result of nuclear stalemate may require a reassessment of America's traditional view of censorship (military security only) since victory and defeat are no longer measured in terms of military strength but as functions of national will and resolution.

METHOD

A content analysis was conducted of two combat

³⁴Frank L. Mott, American Journalism (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 863.

actions, the Tet Offensive and Ap Bia Mountain (commonly referred to as Hamburger Hill), as reported in The New York Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, and The Kansas City Star. Common criticisms of the press are established and then applied to each news story to determine the validity of each criticism and further, in light of a possible psychological warfare program conducted by the North Vietnamese, to consider whether the media performance can be construed as contributing to a diminishing of audience motivation.

It must be noted that this study was restricted to events in the Republic of Vietnam during the time period 1968-69 and to the printed media. Newspapers were selected on the basis of regionalism and large circulations, with no consideration given to political affiliation or views. Time events were selected because of the researcher's opinion that the two combat actions have had psychological impact on the "national will" of the American people.

There is no question that television, the primary news source for the majority of American citizens,³⁵

³⁵ Lawrence K. H. Chang and James B. Lemert, "The Invisible Newsman and Other Factors in Media Competition," Journalism Quarterly, Autumn 1968, p. 438, citing "Emerging

possesses the ultimate capability to distort news presentations. The camera lens is extremely selective in what it views and editors may edit to present an exciting visual experience that has little relation to the larger reality. Also, network commentators, by careful choice of wording, body posture, and subtle facial expressions, may convey prior judgments or political positions. This study, however, was restricted to newspapers, a matter of record easily accessible to everyone.

The method of analysis noted above may well have deficiencies when viewed from the perspective of the physical sciences or even from the more advanced statistical techniques of the social sciences. It is unfortunate that no scientific model for news analysis exists, and this appears to be a lucrative area for future study. However, in an attempt to analyze systematically the news content, a series of criteria were established and outlined (admittedly an intuitive formulation, but, of themselves, within the bounds of responsible journalistic practice) in the initial

Profiles of Television and Other Mass Media: Public Attitudes, 1959-1967," a Roper study in which 64 per cent of his sample audience obtained their news from television.

portion of the analysis chapter of this study. Despite the dangers inherent in any present attempt at analysis, the critical need for conclusions in this area demands an immediate effort without waiting for the precision contained in the classical experimental design. Though lacking the efficiency of intervention in separating cause-and-effect relationships, the case study method utilizing content analysis is applied as an alternative to awaiting future developments of more precise methods. Further comment on the adequacy of research methods is contained in Appendix B.

CHAPTER II

THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

FUNCTIONS

To examine the performance of the media¹ in any context, it is necessary to outline the basic functions of the journalistic profession. The four functions of informing the public, guarding against governmental abuse, acting in the economic role, and entertaining and educating are briefly noted.

Informing the Public

The primary function of the media is to inform the public of the news events of the day in a truthful and factual manner. This allows the citizen to be capable of engaging in inquiry and discussion of events which result in the formulation of opinion that ultimately guides governmental policies. The Commission on the Freedom of the Press

¹Printed media are of primary concern in this study, but contents of this chapter apply equally to other forms.

commented on this need for information in fulfilling the responsibilities of citizenship by noting that:

. . . the citizen's need has increased. He is dependent on the quality, proportion, and extent of his news supply, not only for his personal access to the world of event, thought, and feeling, but also for the materials of his duties as a citizen and judge of public affairs. The soundness of his judgment affects the workings of the state and even the peace of the world, involving the survival of the state as a free community.²

Therefore, while informing the public, the media have the attendant and critical responsibility of providing a "truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning."³ It should not be a requirement for the reader to sift fact from fiction and to determine whether opinion is present in the news story. Editorials and analyses of news events are properly contained within the media provided they are unmistakably labeled as such at all times. It is certainly accepted that the media should report the truth, but "of equal importance with reportorial accuracy are the identification of fact as fact and opinion as opinion, and their

²Commission on the Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 17.

³Commission on the Freedom of the Press, p. 20.

separation, so far as possible."⁴ The reader is not being informed if the news is slanted to present the personal views of the reporter. In this writer's opinion, this cannot be termed interpretative reporting but must be considered as irresponsible journalism at its worst.

Guarding Against Governmental Abuse

The function of guarding against governmental abuse is certainly also a basic function in society, and the media as a guardian needs little comment. They are, and properly so, in the forefront whenever there is danger that the government may be, or is, contemplating encroachment on individual freedoms.⁵ Also, some would extend this function to the area of foreign affairs. For example, Reston stated:

My theme is that the rising power of the United States in world affairs, and particularly of the American President, requires, not a more compliant press, but a relentless barrage of facts and criticism, as noisy but also as accurate as artillery fire. This means a less provincial, even a less nationalistic, press, because our job in this age, as I see it, is not to serve as cheerleaders for our side in the present world struggle but to help the largest possible number of

⁴Commission on the Freedom of the Press, pp. 21-22.

⁵Harold D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1950), pp. 178-79.

people to see the realities of the changing and convulsive world in which American policy must operate. It also means a redefinition of what is "news," with more attention to the causes rather than merely the effects of international strife--at least by those American agencies, newspapers and networks covering and influencing world affairs.⁶

This position, as opposed to being a guardian of individual rights, is debatable and may be a factor in the reporting of the Vietnam conflict. Nevertheless, it is apparent that a growing number of newsmen feel a responsibility in the area of foreign affairs.

Acting in Economic Role

Obviously, the media exist in large measure due to the revenues resulting from advertising. Conversely, the media contribute to the commercial business of the nation. The advertising of products is the essential being of the media (approximately 75 per cent of the average newspaper is advertising), and it is difficult to imagine the nation without the media's performing this vital economic role.

Entertaining and Educating

The fourth, and final, role of entertaining and

⁶James Reston, The Artillery of the Press (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1967), pp. vii-viii.

educating--special features, sports, comics, political cartoons, and the like--needs no comment.

RESTRICTIONS

The media are restricted from complete license by three limitations. They are protection of the individual against untruthful and unjustifiable or libelous statements, restraints of public opinion, and national interest.

Protection of Individuals

Any citizen may bring civil action for damages if he considers himself to have been libeled. Needless to say, determining whether the specific statement is, in fact, libelous may be a problem. However, the unique legal position that "every active participant in the publication of a libel is usually responsible in damages, regardless of fault,"⁷ which makes the reporter, editor, publisher, distributor, and news vendors liable, tends to cause the media to exercise caution in this area.

⁷Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Government and Mass Communications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), I, 79.

Restraints of Public Opinion

The reaction of the public to the content of the media is an effective constraint, especially if the reaction is so adverse as to be demonstrated in an economic boycott of advertised products. This would not prevent the media from appealing to a certain segment of the population provided sufficient financial support remained available. However, public opinion usually exerts its influence in a subtle manner which does not require total boycott. Letters to the editor, a minor drop in circulation, verbal feedback to reporters, editors, and businessmen who place the advertising--all serve to inform the media as to what is acceptable to the public.

National Interest

The national interest during two world wars has been a sufficient reason for responsible journalists to restrict their publications without formal censorship laws. Even in the "Cold War" it has been apparent that full disclosure of the news may not be in the national interest. Yet, there has been recent debate on what constitutes national interest. In the Vietnam conflict the media have not restrained themselves with the view that they have a foreign policy

responsibility such as cited in Reston's statement (see pages 41-42). However, David Lawrence, editor of U.S. News & World Report, stated that:

. . . the press has a duty to keep in mind that wars are fought not merely on the battlefield, but also psychologically in published articles that influence the morale of peoples in the countries which are engaged in the conflict.⁸

Lawrence's comment was prompted by the immediate publication of a news story in which a small number of American soldiers in Vietnam had refused to obey orders. This news was hailed by the Viet Cong radio as the beginning of a general mutiny among American troops. Lawrence made the point that United States national interest might have been better served had this story been withheld until the full story was available. There is no question that this event was immediate news. Yet, might not a temporary hold, to await the full story, have better served the national interest? This, of course, is a judgment area, but a sense of "voluntary censorship" in the national interest at least would have caused the matter to be considered. However,

⁸David Lawrence, "What's Become of 'Voluntary Censorship'?", U.S. News & World Report, 8 September 1969, p. 92.

Reston has called for a less nationalistic press which does not serve as cheerleaders for America's side. In that case there would be no need for "voluntary censorship" as the media are called upon to respond to an interest that is beyond the national interest.

RESPONSIBILITIES

In performing their basic functions, the media have two primary responsibilities: presenting the news without bias and avoiding special interests.

Presenting News Without Bias

The requirement for the truth which is not slanted, to the extent humanly possible, was commented upon under the first function of the media. Biased reporting, which conceals the intent of the reporter, is a perversion of the basic tenets of journalism. Pure objectivity is not possible, but a reporter, if he is to be fair to his readers and to his profession, must attempt to keep his personal opinions from the story unless they are acknowledged as such.

Avoiding Special Interests

The media should attempt to remain economically free

of special interest groups. Involvement brings control that is not in the public interest, especially if the involvement is hidden from the public knowledge. The "Canons of Journalism" of the American Society of Newspaper Editors include the statement that "a journalist who uses his power for any selfish or otherwise unworthy purpose is faithless to a high trust."⁹ A complete listing of the "Canons" is contained in Appendix C.

CRITICISMS

A listing of criticisms of the performance of the media in Vietnam is difficult and open to debate in regards to completeness and topic organization. In a thesis entitled "The Newsmen in Vietnam: Responsible or Irresponsible," Lieutenant Commander Ralph W. Blanchard, United States Navy, outlined five basic criticisms which have been made against the press corps in Vietnam. The broad form of his categories are utilized in this study, with comment on the conclusions of his study reserved for Chapter V.

Prior to exploring the criticisms, it is necessary

⁹Frank L. Mott, American Journalism (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 726.

to note that news distortion, if it exists, may not be attributed completely to the reporter in the field. The editing process of copy and/or film, coupled with the delivery technique of the commentator or the composition form of the rewrite desk, results in the news that is presented to the public. Therefore, criticisms of the newsmen in Vietnam must be considered as a joint criticism of the larger media organization. The five basic criticisms are position reporting, crisis reporting, uninformed reporting, factual reporting, and not on the team.

Position Reporting

Of all the criticisms noted, position reporting is the most serious deviation from the tenets of responsible journalism since it is a simple yet critical fraud against the public. That the media would use this method of deception (assuming a prior position and then reporting or putting undue stress and emphasis on only those events which support that position), or even that they have a position on the Vietnam conflict other than the pursuit of the truth, would be denied by the media.

According to Carl T. Rowan, noted journalist, the press in Vietnam moves "without fear or favor to find the

truths, palatable and unpalatable."¹⁰ Yet, in his text How To Get Out of Vietnam: The War We Cannot Win, Should Not Wish To Win, Are Not Winning, John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard economist and former United States Ambassador to India, made a statement which places the media in a position from which position reporting is only a step away. He noted:

From the beginning the war was opposed by the articulate part of the student population, by an equally articulate part of the teaching and scientific community, by a large number of writers, by a handful of very effective Senators, by the majority of religious leaders, by a considerable sprinkling of the more concerned and motivated citizenry, and by the most influential of the newspapers. . . . Given this alinement of forces, and even allowing the Administration its advantage in immediate access to press, radio, and television [a capability little and ineffectively exploited], it was in a losing battle for the public mind.¹¹

S. L. A. Marshall, military historian, has also commented on media performance in Vietnam and on the reasons for the alienation of media and government. And, alienation leads to a situation which is less than conducive to objectivity. In regards to media performance, Marshall stated:

¹⁰Carl T. Rowan, "Justice May Depend on Free Press," The Kansas City Times, 5 December 1969, p. 53.

¹¹John K. Galbraith, How To Get Out of Vietnam: The War We Cannot Win, Should Not Wish To Win, Are Not Winning (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1967), p. 26.

In Saigon there are 350 correspondents^[12] supposedly assigned to making the war and its issues understandable to people everywhere, a group thrice the size of the press gallery in the Korean War.

Yet despite all of this elaboration, the struggle in Vietnam is the most wretchedly reported war in the fane [sic] of our history since old Zach Taylor fought at Buena Vista. Never before have men and women in such numbers contributed so little to so many.¹³

To state that the media are deficient and that the government is without blame is not the intent of this study and, in fact, would be the position many would ascribe to the military. Without question, the governmental approach leaves much to be desired. Marshall commented:

For some part of the failure of the press corps in Vietnam in earlier years the government bureaucracy, including the military, was indeed responsible. Its general attitude was suppressive and repressive, made so in part by the secrecy of the Diem regime and the shaky military juntas that immediately followed. Either awkwardness or sheer ignorance, on the part of those who make our policy, strained unduly the relations between press corps and officialdom. The problem could have

¹²Brigadier General Winant Sidle, Chief of Information, Department of the Army, in a press relations seminar, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 9 April 1970, estimated that reporter strength in Vietnam during the Tet Offensive, February 1968, was between 500 and 600 and that this number had dropped to 450 by March 1969. (USACGSC Library tape.)

¹³S. L. A. Marshall, Battles in the Monsoon: Campaigning in the Central Highlands, South Vietnam, Summer 1966 (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1967), p. 12.

been somewhat ameliorated had the Pentagon's director of public information been capable of understanding it. Since he was not, the more prominent members of the press corps sharpened their hatchets against government policy and were awarded Pulitzer prizes for their efforts.¹⁴

So, if the media were opposed to the war from the beginning and were alienated from the government, the question may be asked whether objective reporting could occur. The answer can come only from a detailed examination of specific news reports, and that is the primary task of this study.

The media may refute allegations of position reporting by stating that it is, in fact, interpretive reporting which is required to bind together the essential elements of the story. Interpretive reporting is necessary, but "interpretive reporting can be an abused term, if used in rationalizing what in reality is position reporting."¹⁵ Slanted news, if found, should not be given a more pleasing title.

Crisis Reporting

Crisis reporting is the charge that the media report

¹⁴Marshall, pp. 14-15.

¹⁵Ralph W. Blanchard, "The Newsmen in Vietnam: Responsible or Irresponsible," Naval War College Review.

the sensational events, usually with emphasis on those adverse to the government, with little attention given to lesser events that may be just as essential to the perception of reality. Blanchard quoted Edward Barrett, Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University, as having stated:

There is too much crisis reporting among journalists. Journalism should be less concerned with events as they happen and more concerned with providing the public better background information about the events.¹⁶

This is not to say that good news should dominate the media. Chet Huntley, NBC news correspondent, stated at the George Polk Memorial awards luncheon held on 24 March 1970 that "journalism's role is not and has never been one to cheer up, to mollify, to spread joy."¹⁷ Few would question this statement, and it appears to have been made to divert attention from the crucial charge of position reporting that has been alleged by Vice President Agnew.¹⁸

Jura 1968, p. 21.

¹⁶Blanchard, p. 22.

¹⁷Chet Huntley, "Difficult Time for Newsmen," The Kansas City Times, 25 March 1970, p. 2A.

¹⁸Nationally televised speech on 13 November 1969.

Nevertheless, while good news should not dominate the newspapers, neither should they consist, especially in the Vietnam coverage, of crisis alone. Colonel Robert B. Rigg, United States Army, Retired, commented on this area thus:

The most sensational scenes get the most time and space.
 . . .

But the essential point is: How do varied and often isolated vignettes of military combat engagements and battles represent the war as a whole? Here, the military authorities and press have a basic problem of common nature because the American public needs clarification as to where the conflict in Vietnam is going in terms of military and political progress. Making headlines is one thing. Producing perspective on the war is another. And this has been lacking in the conflict in Vietnam.

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This credibility gap between the press and government officials of any nation has been traditional. But the complexity of the war in Vietnam has widened it and made the press more reliant on its own on-the-spot reports, and on its own interpretation.

The credibility gap remains today as reported by Marquis W. Childs in a dispatch from Saigon on 18 March 1969:

A familiar symptom now recurring is the growing tension between the American press corps and the vast American civilian and military Establishment . . . a phenomenon, with the David Halberstams and others attacking the official line.

The tension today grows out of the conviction that the Establishment is deliberately playing down the consequences of the latest Communist offensive. . . .

Hard working correspondents here through the . . . years have learned by often frustrating experience that war, violence . . . get on Page 1 and on the television and news shows. As the executive of one network . . . put it:

"They want blood . . . if they can get somebody dying on camera that's great."

In-depth reporting of the political subtleties, the complexities of a highly complex situation, is sometimes never sent and never used. . . .¹⁹

Simply stated, this conflict is more than large battles in which large numbers of Americans are killed or South Vietnamese forces are routed. A balance of good and bad is necessary to depict reality. If the media primarily present events that are sensational, they then fail in their responsibility to present a balanced view of the news.

Uninformed Reporting

In regards to the Vietnam War, the criticism of uninformed reporting infers the reporter does not possess the background knowledge and/or an overall appreciation of the situation, yet he reports with authority on events in Vietnam. Marshall commented on newsmen who report the war from the capital city of Saigon in these words:

¹⁹Robert B. Rigg, "How Not To Report a War," Military Review, June 1969, pp. 19-20.

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The battles of which I write were hardly reported as such to the American people. There are some reporters such as Ward Just and Charles Black of Columbus, Ga., who dig in with the combat line, show after show. Invariably those who do are themselves former fighters. I saw no other correspondents in the battle areas. There was the exception when one incident mainly--the dramatic action of Captain Carpenter--brought them forward in platoons to give him the national spotlight.

. . . .

. . . American correspondents are given freer access to the battle fronts and bases, with readier and more agreeable facilities for moving about, than they were ever accorded before in any war. The commanders give them warmer welcome and take them into confidence more fully than in times past.

With all these advantages, and with the exception of perhaps a dozen or so press correspondents, the only members of the corps who consistently work the front are the TV reporters and camera crews. They accept the risk gamely enough. If they have one fault seriously calling for repair it is that they concentrate on the gore, the shock²⁰ the horror and the agony disproportionately.

. . . .

Uninformed reporting is not a criticism that need be overemphasized since it is obvious that some reporters have served a number of years in Southeast Asia and may have a considerable depth of expertise in this area--expertise that, without doubt, at times exceeds that of military officials who serve relatively short periods in the combat

²⁰Marshall, pp. 14-15.

zone. The criticism is, however, a frequently voiced deficiency of the media and must be noted.

Factual Reporting

Factual reporting is a criticism that refers to news reports which are not based on fact. This classification is a misnomer since it refers to erroneous reporting (containing error; mistaken; or incorrect). Therefore, the terminology erroneous reporting is used in this study. In recent years there have been few, if any, stories from Vietnam that have contained basic elements of the story that were not factual. Blanchard referred to only two incidents of this type. First, an Associated Press article in 1963 reported a jeep carrying the American Ambassador had run over and killed a small Vietnamese boy when, in fact, an Army vehicle had slightly injured a Vietnamese girl. Secondly, during the same period, the press accused John H. Richardson, head of the CIA mission in Saigon, of being "too close" to Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. The fact is the relationship was one of America's few accesses to the Diem Administration and the media simply did not possess this fact.²¹

²¹Blanchard, "The Newsmen in Vietnam," p. 23.

The criticism of erroneous (factual) reporting is considered a minor problem since reporting of facts is a basic element of responsible journalism and is an area in which the media closely monitor themselves.

Not On The Team

Hubert Humphrey, Vice President during his trip to Vietnam in November 1967, asked some thirty correspondents: "When you speak to the American people give the benefit of the doubt to our side. I don't think that's asking too much. We're in this together."²² Dean Rusk, Secretary of State in February 1968, asked the media to act as if they were on the side of this government.²³ It is doubtful whether the United States Government should expect the media to mold the news to favor the government's position regardless of facts. The function of the media is truth and they should perform as a balance to possible governmental indiscretions. However, in a conflict in which the "will to continue" is a critical function, the United States can

²²"Whose Benefit? Whose Doubt?," Newsweek, 13 November 1967, p. 68.

²³"Rusk's Blast at the Press Over Criticism of the War," San Francisco Chronicle, 28 February 1968, p. 16.

little afford to have "its team" opposed by biased or position reporting. Perhaps a new term is needed for acting in the national interest since anything less than "being on the team" may benefit the enemy and ultimately spell defeat.

Frye, commenting on the possible effect of news reports, noted:

In the ultimate extreme, it would theoretically be possible for a damaging news story or broadcast so to undercut support for the war as to force an American withdrawal. The cumulative effect of lesser damage could, over a period of time, be the same.²⁴

This possibility may be the most persuasive military argument for censorship in combat zones. The basic ideals of the nation and the journalistic profession demand truthful reporting, and if the media are allowed to operate freely in Vietnam, or future combat zones, the government can hardly expect less.

²⁴William R. Frye, "Recurring Matters of Truth, Credibility and Effect in War News," The Kansas City Times, 12 January 1970, p. 11B.

CHAPTER III

CENSORSHIP

The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a brief overview of censorship as it has occurred in America's national history and as it is established today. While the overview is not intended to be a complete statement of the subject, it does contain those highlights necessary to provide background information. A concise survey of the past and present systems is invaluable in understanding contemporary problem areas and postulating the theories of the future.

Colonial Period through World War I

The abhorrence with which censorship is held in the American mind can be traced to events of the colonial period, where an emerging press was in the forefront of the struggle against the Royal Governors and the British Crown. This struggle followed a long period of oppression in which the right to print the truth was in continual debate.

During the early colonial period, severe censorship was in effect as the government recognized the hazards of free thought and discussion and the threat to the control exercised by the government. Those in power had a deep distrust of the people, and this opinion was frankly stated in 1671 by the Governor of Virginia, Sir William Berkeley. He said:

But, I thank God, we have not free schools nor printing; and I hope we shall not have these hundred years. For learning has brought disobedience and heresy and sects into the world; and printing has divulged them and libels against the government. God keep us from both.¹

The first American newspaper, Benjamin Harris'

Publick Occurrences: Both Forreign and Domestick, published on 25 September 1690, enjoyed a press run of one issue. The governor and council found the paper to have been published "Without the least Privy or Countenance of Authority" and "that therein is contained Reflections of a very high nature: As also sundry doubtful and uncertain Reports." They stated their "high Resentment and Disallowance of said Pamphlet" and ordered that "the same be Suppressed and called in; strictly forbidding any person or

¹Frank L. Mott, American Journalism (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 6.

persons for the future to Set forth any thing in Print without License first obtained."² So, this first newspaper found itself in serious trouble not for printing libel but, coupled with the fatal mistake of failing to gain the license of the government, for printing the truth. Fourteen years were to elapse before another effort appeared.

The Boston News-Letter, the Boston Gazette, and the New-England Courant were the three initial newspapers in the colonies. The first two were "Published by Authority," but it was the New-England Courant, published in 1721 by James Franklin, older brother of Benjamin, that was the first American newspaper to speak with the voice of rebellion and the first to "establish the tradition of editorial independence."³ However, Franklin soon stepped over the bounds of prudence and was quickly consigned to a month in jail on charges of contempt against the government, followed within six months by a total ban against his publishing anything at all that was not first supervised (censored) by the

²Mott, p. 9.

³Edwin Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretative History of Journalism (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 50.

government.⁴ Franklin circumvented this restriction by placing young Benjamin's name on the paper as publisher. This ploy was successful and James Franklin continued to publish for approximately three more years, although "the Courant was tamer than before It had lost its sting."⁵ Despite the restraint of the government, Franklin thus gained the distinction of bringing forth the first newspaper which displayed editorial independence, no matter that it was curtailed.

The freedom to print that which the individual editor considered to be the truth, as first attempted by Franklin, and to expose the excesses of government culminated in the trial of John Peter Zenger. Zenger's trial was a contest of freedom of the press as well as the right of the citizen to resist the unlawful demands of the government. Andrew Hamilton, Zenger's counsel, stated in defense:

In New York a man may make very free with his God but he must take special care what he says of his governor. It is agreed upon by all that this is a reign of liberty; and while men keep within the bounds of truth I hope they may with safety both speak and write their sentiments of the conduct of men in power. I mean of that part of their conduct only which affects the

⁴Emery, p. 53.

⁵Mott, p. 21.

liberty or the property of the people under their
administration. . . .⁶

Hamilton admitted the publication of the papers on which the indictment was charged and based his defense on the fact that the truth was a defense for the charge of libel.⁷ Even though this defense was not to become the law for another sixty years, the jury returned a verdict of "Not Guilty" and the event became a milestone in the development of a free press in this country.

The period between the Zenger trial and the Revolutionary War found little conflict over freedom of the press, perhaps more as a result of the composition and limited distribution of the newspapers rather than the immediate result of the Zenger trial. There were no editorial pages and opinions were presented by leading citizens in letters to the editor (printer), with little opportunity to excite an audience much larger than the local town or village.⁸

There is little need to explore the role of the press in the period immediately preceding and during the

⁶William L. Chenery, Freedom of the Press (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1955), p. 118.

⁷Chenery, p. 116.

⁸Chenery, p. 121.

Revolutionary War except to note that without its manipulation of public opinion it is unlikely the war would have occurred. In regard to censorship during this period, the Royal Governors were unable to proceed due to the fact that the grand juries would not indict and stronger measures might have caused violent reaction. In 1765, New York's Lieutenant Governor Colden wrote:

I agreed with the Gentlemen of the Council that considering the present temper of the people this is not a proper time to prosecute the printers and Publishers of the Seditious Papers.⁹

Therefore, with little censorship by legal means, papers were influenced instead by mobs and threats, especially against the Troy and even some of the impartial papers. The effectiveness of the press was not lost on the British. Ambrose Serle, head of the Royalist press in New York, stated in a letter to Lord Dartmouth in 1776:

One is astonished to see with what avidity they [the colonial newspapers] are sought after, and how implicitly they are believed, by the great Bulk of the People. . . . Government may find it expedient, in the Sum of things, to employ this popular Engine.¹⁰

Considering the role of the press in the birth of this nation, it is not difficult to conclude that imposition

⁹Mott, p. 103.

¹⁰Mott, p. 108.

of censorship is against the basic ideals of the American culture. In Emery's words:

Even the most obstinate bureaucrat had been forced to concede that this new engine of public opinion was not to be abused with impunity. Eighteenth-century journalists had learned a lesson that apparently has to be re-learned at regular intervals--that when the public supports them, no power is strong enough to throttle press freedom. They learned that when editors are identified with the public cause, putting responsibility to the people above whims and personal convenience, they not only win the essential backing, but help to generate other forces for freedom within the community.¹¹

Another series of events in the initial period of this democracy also served to greatly influence and contribute to the formulation of freedom of the press as a basic American ideal. The decade of the 1790's witnessed the French revolution and the emergence of France as a powerful and imperialistic nation. To undermine the independent foreign policy of the United States, French propagandists operated through the U.S. media in the hope of destroying the authority of President Washington and thereby undermining his government. These activities resulted in the Alien and Sedition Acts, effective 14 July 1798 to 3 March 1801, in which twenty-five editors, politicians, and others were

¹¹Emery, pp. 63-64.

charged. Of the twenty-five cases, eleven went to trial; ten individuals were convicted and six served prison sentences.¹²

The election of Thomas Jefferson, who had campaigned for nullification of the Alien and Sedition Acts and who was a true advocate of press freedom (even though he was often ill-used by the press), coupled with the lapse of the Acts and the dissolution of the Federalist Party, served to create a climate that permitted press freedom without interference from federal law. Jefferson's party remained in power for sixty years, and his position on a free press became a party principle and a national tradition. Jefferson, in a letter written to Edward Carrington in 1787, stated his opinion of the press and of the people:

I am persuaded that the good sense of the people will always be found to be the best army. They may be led astray for a moment, but will soon correct themselves. The people are the only censors of their governors; and even their errors will tend to keep these to the true principles of their institution. To punish these errors too severely would be to suppress the only safeguard of the public liberty. The way to prevent these irregular interpositions of the people is to give them full information of their affairs through the channel of the public papers, and to contrive that those papers should penetrate to the whole mass of the people.

¹²Chenery, pp. 48 & 51.

The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. . . . But I should mean that every man should receive those papers, and be capable of reading them.¹³

During that same year, Jefferson expressed his view on opposition to the government in a letter he wrote Abigail Adams, wife of John Adams:

The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions that I wish it always to be kept alive. It will often be exercised when wrong, but better so than not to be exercised at all. I like a little rebellion now and then. It is like a storm in the atmosphere.¹⁴

Finally, Jefferson spoke of the national will in his inaugural address on 4 March 1801:

I believe this, on the contrary, the strongest government on earth. I believe it is the only one where every man, at the call of the law, would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern.¹⁵

These statements, as related to resistance and freedom of opinion and of the press, are considered in the light of contemporary events in Chapter V of this thesis.

¹³Emery, p. 167.

¹⁴Emery, p. 30.

¹⁵Emery, pp. 24-25.

Suffice to note at this point that it is of little wonder, considering these events of national development, that the United States is ultra-sensitive to even the insinuation of the imposition of censorship for any purpose except that of national security during wartime.

Censorship during the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War of 1847 did not pose a problem to security because of the time element required for the news to be transmitted from the battlefield to the printed page. In the majority of cases the news had simply lost its military significance before it was released to the public.

The Civil War, with the advent of telegraphic communications, was the first war in which the details of combat actions could be reported in the newspapers with only a minor time lag between the events (as opposed to the Mexican War of 1847, in which the scoop on the fall of Vera Cruz, published by the Baltimore Sun, appeared twelve days after the event).¹⁶ Immediate news precipitated the crisis of how to keep the public informed while not giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Also, this period, with an irresponsible

¹⁶Gerald W. Johnson, et al., The Sunpapers of Baltimore (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1937), p. 80.

press and a government unsure of the balance between national security and the right to know, was to see the establishment of poor relationships between the press and the military. Gramling, commenting on the performance of the press during this period, noted:

Generally overlooked in those hectic days was the part the special correspondents of many northern newspapers were playing by disclosing Union strategy to the Confederacy. Not content with attempts to get news first, they tried to anticipate it and unwittingly served the Confederate cause. For a long time their stories kept the South remarkably well informed on federal plans. Southern spies in the North watched the newspapers closely, forwarding any important information they contained, sometimes even maps of projects, campaigns, or fortifications. . . .

It was not only this aiding of the enemy that was turning Union generals against the war correspondents as a group. Too many reporters were writing fantastic, erroneous stories. They embroidered "atrocities" reports. They set themselves up as experts in military strategy and they railed at any officer whose ideas on a campaign differed from their own. And woe to the general who did not acknowledge their dignity.¹⁷

Considering Gramling's second paragraph, it is apparent the conflict of the 1860's may have contained elements similar to those of the 1970's.

General William T. Sherman's relationship with the

¹⁷ Oliver Gramling, AP. The Story of News (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940), p. 44.

press was to play a large part in the development of organized censorship. He freely stated his opinion that military operations suffered because of information published in the newspapers. The reporters countered by printing the following story in the Cincinnati Commercial on 11 December 1861:

"General William T. Sherman Insane!"

The painful intelligence reaches us in such form that we are not at liberty to disclose it, that General William T. Sherman, late commander of the Department of the Cumberland, is insane. It appears that he was at the time while commanding in Kentucky stark mad.¹⁸

Needless to say, Sherman did not soon forgive or forget this slanderous story. His hostility was expressed in his reputed reaction to the report that three correspondents had just been killed by an exploding shell: "Good! Now we shall have news from hell before breakfast!"¹⁹ Sherman's contribution to censorship came when he arrested Thomas E. Knox, who had forwarded information that was clearly in violation of military regulations, as a spy. The intervention of the President saved Knox, but Sherman obtained, in return, "the understanding that all correspondents must be

¹⁸Greuling, p. 45.

¹⁹Douglass Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), p. 85.

accredited, or recognized, journalists; and that they must be acceptable to commanders in the field."²⁰ This understanding continues in effect today.

The first military censorship system was attempted during the Civil War, but it was applied in a haphazard manner and was generally ineffective. In August 1861, in response to the requirements of military security and editorial criticism of the war, the War Department published a general order calling attention to the 57th Article of War, which provided for court martial, with a maximum sentence of death, for either directly or indirectly giving military information to the enemy. The general order also precluded the printing of any news of camps, troops, military or naval movement, except by the express permission of the officer in command."²¹ This order had little effect on the press and was generally disregarded.

A second attempt at censorship brought together General George B. McClellan, Commander of the Army of the Potomac, and a number of Washington correspondents in an agreement which was the forerunner of present-day voluntary

²⁰Emery, p. 297.

²¹Chenery, p. 155.

censorship policy. The newsmen signed an agreement that they would transmit no information of value to the enemy, while General McClellan reciprocated with the promise of all possible assistance to the newsmen in the collection of news that was of interest to the public. Within three months the government, because of conflict between the War and State Departments, violated the intent of the McClellan agreement and the press returned to its old system of obtaining the news on its own.²²

Federal officials seized thousands of telegrams in an initial attempt at censorship early in the war, and on 8 July 1861 telegraph companies were forbidden from sending information of a military nature. However, the official censor, H. E. Thayer, was under control of the Department of State and had little understanding of the problems inherent in censorship.²³ Because of the conflict between the War and State Departments, the President assigned responsibility for control of the program to the War Department. The Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, in an order dated 25 February 1862, clarified prior restrictions on the press

²²Emery, pp. 295-96.

²³Emery, p. 296.

by requiring correspondents to submit copy to military authorities before transmission, with the understanding that deletions would be made only on military matters. Stanton decreed:

All newspapers publishing military news, however obtained, not authorized by official authority, will be excluded thereafter from receiving information by telegraph and from transmitting their publications by railroad.²⁴

This decree was later amended to permit publication of "past facts, leaving out details of military forces, and all statements from which the number, position and strength of the military forces of the United States can be inferred."²⁵

Even though these items did not please the press, Stanton, with his close control of the telegraph and the railroad, was able to exert some measure of control over the reporting of the war. Therefore, during the Civil War period the basic precedents of military censorship were established through an evolution of trial and error. Rapid communications had forced actions that were designed to restrict the flow of any information that may have been vital to the enemy.

²⁴Gramling, pp. 45-46.

²⁵Gramling, p. 46.

Those who would deny the ability of an irresponsible press to manipulate public opinion (though Walter Lippmann would contend the "mystical force called Public Opinion" cannot be effectively created by the press)²⁶ are referred to the inciting performance of the press during the Spanish-American War of 1898. William Randolph Hearst, editor of the New York Journal, on receiving the following telegram from his correspondent in Cuba:

HEARST, JOURNAL, NEW YORK

EVERYTHING IS QUIET. THERE IS NO TROUBLE HERE. THERE WILL BE NO WAR. WISH TO RETURN. REMINGTON

is reputed to have communicated the following response:

REMINGTON, HAVANA

PLEASE REMAIN. YOU FURNISH THE PICTURES AND I'LL FURNISH THE WAR. HEARST²⁷

Hearst later denied he sent this particular telegram, but regardless of authenticity, there is no question that the press incited public opinion to the point of war in

²⁶ Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 250, quoting Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Pelican Books, 1946), p. 274.

²⁷ Mott, p. 529, quoting Creelman, On the Great Highway, pp. 177-78.

spite of the long-standing unwillingness of the President and even though Spain had capitulated on the major points of contention. Censorship during this period was lenient and not extremely effective. As Mott stated many years later:

The leniency of the military censorship on the American side was extraordinary, and newspapers freely printed reports of the movements of the navy and army and such news and rumors of American plans as they could gather. Referring to the early months of the war, the Journalist observed: "We gave the Spaniards no use for spies, for our yellow journals became themselves the spies of Spain."²⁸

The ability of the press to operate predominantly as they pleased, as was demonstrated during the Spanish-American War, was greatly curtailed in World War I. Control included establishment of the Committee on Public Information (more a propaganda than a censorship organization), a voluntary censorship on military and naval matters, and the passage of the Espionage Act of 15 June 1917, the Trading-with-the Enemy Act of 6 October 1917, and the Sedition Act of 16 May 1918. The press found their activities handicapped by close control of their movements in the combat zones, the military censorship of dispatches by the press divisions under the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G2

²⁸Mott, p. 536.

(Intelligence), and the British control of communication facilities. Yet, for the most part, the press worked closely with the government in developing and assisting a system designed to bring the maximum amount of war news to the American people. This is not to say that the press was a passive agent of the government in all cases. Apparently William Randolph Hearst and certain Republican Senators continued to debate the question of full freedom of the press. George Creel, the newspaperman President Wilson appointed to head the Committee on Public Information, commented thus on the Republican Senators in this debate: "The heavens may fall, the earth may be consumed, but the right of a Congressman to lie and defame remains inviolate."²⁹

Also, Associated Press exposure of the 1917 "Fourth of July fake," in which the government overplayed a naval engagement into an Allied victory, illustrates that journalistic initiative was not completely suppressed. The following conversation, despite efforts of the government to

²⁹ Alfred M. Lee, The Daily Newspaper in America (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 453, quoting George Creel, How We Advertised America, p. 21.

propagandize, illustrates where the faith of the public was placed:

At a desk in the office of the Tribune Herald at Rome, Georgia, J. D. McCartney sat before a telephone, answering the endless queries.

"Yes, madam, it's right this time. . . . Yes, it's correct. . . . It's all in the extra that's on the street now. . . . Oh, no, no doubt whatsoever. . . . Yes. . . . Yes. . . . Yes. . . ."

It was a boring job when everyone else was out celebrating. Another call. A staid, elderly woman by the tone of her voice.

"Who says the Armistice has been signed?" she asked briskly.

"The State Department at Washington," intoned McCartney for the hundredth time.

"Oh, pshaw!" the voice exclaimed impatiently. "Does The Associated Press say it?"³⁰

World War II to Present

The attack on Pearl Harbor precipitated United States involvement in World War II and served to unify the press and government far beyond anything thought possible in the past. Military censorship was instituted on 7 December 1941, and within two weeks Congress (per the First War Powers Act) gave the President the power to censor all

³⁰ Gramling, p. 283.

communications between the United States and foreign countries. The President created the Office of Censorship to coordinate this effort and directed it to "coordinate the efforts of the American press and radio in voluntarily withholding from publication military and other information of value to the enemy."³¹ As noted in A Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press, issued on 15 January 1942, a voluntary censorship was established which

carefully outlined to those who published newspapers, magazines, books, and other printed materials what would constitute improper handling of news having to do with troops, planes, ships, war production, armaments, military installations, and weather.³²

The Office of War Information, created by Executive Order on 13 June 1942, was "to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the government."³³ This organization, in effect, was a propaganda effort and was not connected with the Office of Censorship. The director of the Office of War Information, Elmer Davis, described propaganda as

³¹Emery, p. 604.

³²Emery, p. 604.

³³Mott, p. 765.

an instrument; it may employ truth instead of falsehood in its operation, and it may be directed to worthy instead of unworthy purposes. To condemn the instrument because the wrong people use it for the wrong purposes is like condemning the automobile because criminals use it for a getaway. . . . We are going to use the truth, and we are going to use it toward the end of winning the war, for we know what will happen to the American people if we lose it. "Propaganda" is a word in bad odor in this country; but there is no public hostility to the idea of education, and we regard this part of our job as education.³⁴

Except for minor occurrences, the voluntary censorship of World War II was a tremendous success. That success may be attributed, in most part, to the factor of unity and cohesion among the American people. An intense and common threat to survival aids in accomplishing the necessary actions inherent in that survival.

General Douglas MacArthur attempted to conduct a limited war without censorship during the initial months of the Korean War. However, the press quickly came under criticism for their stories of complaining and despondent soldiers, and two reporters temporarily lost their accreditation on charges of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. In January 1951, after the press reported that MacArthur had

³⁴Mott, p. 766, quoting Elmer Davis, War Information and Censorship.

recommended an immediate withdrawal and then, further, proceeded to criticize the general's military tactics, full censorship was imposed. According to General MacArthur, this censorship had been recommended by the top newspaper executives of the United States.³⁵ The censorship imposed, however, went far beyond that expected by the press. Emery commented:

Stringent regulations imposed in January, 1951, went further, however, than any newsman would have desired. They covered not only censorship of military information but of all statements which would injure the morale of UN forces or which would embarrass the United States, its allies, or neutral countries. Correspondents complained that use of the word "retreat" was interpreted by the censors as being embarrassing, and they contended that MacArthur had brought about a political and psychological censorship, as well as a military one. The most dangerous provision of the new censorship was one making correspondents subject to trial by court-martial for serious violations of the rules.³⁶

President Truman's removal of General MacArthur from the Korean Command over a debate on command authority caused the censorship situation to ease somewhat. In December 1952 the Department of Defense transferred the censorship function from intelligence to public relations officers and combined all of the military services under a uniform plan.

³⁵Emery, pp. 616-17.

³⁶Emery, p. 617.

Field Manual 45-25 (13 August 1954) listed policies that followed guidelines of the following principles:

No news items will be released if it encompasses the following:

1. supplies military information of value to the enemy; or
2. has an adverse effect upon the combat efficiency of our forces or those of our allies; or
3. is false or inaccurate in respects which are detrimental to our forces or those of our allies and at the same time be of service to the enemy.³⁷

The current Field Manual 45-25 (16 June 1967) shows the controlling principles are:

1. The sole criterion for the killing or temporary withholding of any information in material submitted for review is that it would be of value to the enemy in his prosecution of the war effort.
2. All information which does not come under this specific heading is releasable . . .³⁸

In May 1961, during the early days of United States Vietnam involvement, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara published Department of Defense Directive 5230-13, which noted:

³⁷ Department of the Army, FM 45-25, Field Press Censorship, 1954, pp. 4-5.

³⁸ Department of the Army, FM 45-25, Field Press Censorship, 1967, pp. 6-7.

The public information policies of the Department of Defense require a delicate accommodation of two competing values. As President Kennedy has observed, the challenge our time imposes "two requirements that may seem contradictory in tones, but which must be reconciled and fulfilled . . . the need for far greater public information . . . the need for far greater official secrecy." The reconciliation of these two requirements is particularly difficult within the Department of Defense. In order to provide some further guidance for those who must deal with the problem, I am setting out here four principles. This guidance is intended to help the members of the Department to meet both requirements. While it will restrict the flow of properly classified information in some respect, it will also encourage more open, responsible discussion of the pros and cons of national defense policies and practices.

The four principles are:

1. In a democratic society the public must be kept informed of the major issues in national defense policy. Because the most important issues are likely to be the most difficult ones, the arguments on both sides must be clear, so that there is a consensus of confidence in the ultimate decision. We are under a special obligation to disclose mistakes and ineffective administration and operations. The public has at least as much right to bad news as to good news.

2. It is essential to avoid disclosure of information that can be of material assistance to our potential enemies, and thereby weaken our defense position. It is equally important to avoid overclassification--when in doubt underclassify. In no event should overclassification be used to avoid public discussion of controversial matters.

3. Public statements of what appears to be Department of Defense policy may reflect our policy in fact.

4. In public discussions, all officials of the Department should confine themselves to defense matters. They should particularly avoid discussion of foreign

policy matters, a field which is reserved for the President and Department of State. This long-established principle recognizes the danger that when the Defense officials express opinions on foreign policy, their words can be taken as the policy of the government.³⁹

In 1967 the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act, commonly referred to as the Freedom of Information Law, made available to the media all information not included under the following nine exemptions:

1. National Security Matters - Information "specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy."

2. Rules for Bargaining or Negotiating - Anything "related solely to the internal rules and practices of any agency."

3. Information Which Is Exempted by Statute or Executive Order - Those things "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."

4. Privileged Communications - "Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from any person and privileged or confidential."

5. Internal Correspondence or Working Papers - "Inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the agency."

6. Investigatory Files - "Those files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a private party."

³⁹ Robert S. McNamara [Secretary of Defense], DOD Directive 5230-13, Principles of Public Information Policy, May 1961, pp. 1-2.

7. Medical or Personnel Files - "Personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."

8. Papers Dealing with Regulation of Financial Institutions - "Matters that are contained in or related to examination, operating or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of, any agency responsible for the regulation of financial institutions."

9. Geological and Geophysical Data - "Matters concerning wells"; i.e., oil and gas findings.⁴⁰

Currently established information rules (ground rules) covering reports not releasable unless approved by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, were published in 1968 and identify:

1. Future plans, operations or strikes.
2. Information on or about confirmation of rules of engagement.
3. Amount of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand by combat units (ordnance includes weapons or weapons systems).
4. During an operation, unit designations and troop movement, tactical deployments, name of operations and size of friendly forces involved.
5. Intelligence units activities, methods of operations or specific locations.

⁴⁰U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Subj R1005/0, Army Information Program: Lesson Plan, 7 April 1970, pp. LP-1-4 & LP-1-5.

6. Exact number and type of casualties or damages suffered by friendly units.

7. Number of sorties and amount of ordnance expended by strikes outside RVN [Republic of Vietnam].

8. Information on aircraft taking off for strikes, en route to, or returning from target area. Information on strikes while they are in progress.

9. Identity of units and location of airbases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.

10. Number of aircraft damaged or any other indications of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground anti-air defenses.

11. Tactical specifics such as altitudes, courses, speeds or angle of attack (General descriptions, such as "low and fast" may be used).

12. Information on or confirmation of planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.

13. Specific identification of enemy weapons systems utilized to down friendly aircraft.

14. Details including down aircraft while SAR [search and rescue] operations are in progress.

15. Aerial photos of fixed installations.⁴¹

Any reporter who violates these ground rules may have his accreditation removed, which, in turn, would result in action ranging from minor restrictions to possible

⁴¹Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Memorandum to the Press, Interpretation of Ground Rules, 27 March 1968.

expulsion from the country. Few reporters, however, have been punished for violation of these ground rules, a notable exception being John S. Carroll, news correspondent who was given an indefinite suspension that was later reduced to six months and then to sixty days.⁴² The specifics of Carroll's violation are commented upon in the consideration of the ground rules after the Tet offensive.

Field press censorship contingency plans were prepared for the Vietnam conflict but never implemented.⁴³ Secretary of Defense McNamara and General William C. Westmoreland, commander of United States Forces in Vietnam, chose to reject both formal and voluntary censorship in Vietnam, relying instead on the voluntary cooperation of newsmen in observing the ground rules.⁴⁴ The cooperation of the newsmen, however, has been less than perfect. In February 1968 a directive entitled "Denial of Intelligence

⁴²"Reports: Khesanh [by John S. Carroll], . . .," Atlantic, October 1968, p. 20.

⁴³Colonel Ralph H. Loffler, "Preparedness for Field Press Censorship in the 1970's," U.S. Army War College research element essay, 22 September 1969, p. 3.

⁴⁴Colonel George E. Moranda, "Press Relations in Low Intensity Conflicts," U.S. Army War College student research paper, 8 April 1966, p. 34.

Information to the Enemy" was issued as a result of the reporting of the Tet offensive and the Khe Sanh battle. It directed newsmen to withhold information which would be of intelligence value to the enemy (number of enemy rounds hitting friendly installations, number of United States and allied casualties, material damage, and the like).⁴⁵ In the case of Khe Sanh, the North Vietnamese had no way to determine the effectiveness of their attacks except through United States media. The Tet directive was designed to stop the flow of military intelligence to the North Vietnamese government since the previous ground rules had been often violated by reporters who were assuming the enemy knew everything anyway. It was reported that General Westmoreland had changed his mind concerning censorship and then believed it should have been imposed long ago.⁴⁶ Carroli, in June 1968, responded to the new restrictions by violating the first ground rule in breaking the story of the withdrawal from Khe Sanh prior to its release by the Saigon

⁴⁵Colonel Gordon A. Moon, II, "Military Security Versus the Right To Know," Army, July 1968, p. 60.

⁴⁶"New Rules in Vietnam," Newsweek, 11 March 1968, p. 88.

military headquarters. Carroll's defense was that he considered the story important to the American people regardless of the restrictions of the military command. Carroll was in disagreement with the United States defense of Khe Sanh and stated:

The American public could be counted upon to take a dim view of it all if the military were to announce frankly: "Your sons are at Khesanh to win a psychological victory, or at least to prevent a psychological defeat."⁴⁷

This disagreement in the basic policy behind the defense of Khe Sanh may have influenced Carroll in his belief that the story was that important to the American people. As noted above, his violation of military security resulted in his suspension.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, on assuming office, issued a memorandum dated 4 March 1969 which basically restated Secretary McNamara's previous position.

Mr. Laird stated:

1. Security is essential, therefore, information which would adversely affect the security of our country or endanger our men should not be disclosed.
2. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.

⁴⁷Carroll, p. 8.

3. Information will not be classified solely because its disclosure would be embarrassing.

4. Those involved in the Public Affairs program of the Defense Department and its agencies should ensure a review of their practices and plans to ensure maximum free flow of information to the public.⁴⁸

These, then, are the basic statements and positions of the United States government in providing information to the people while attempting to protect the security of military information and while utilizing and depending on a system of voluntary cooperation by the media. Has this system, designed to give the public and the media maximum information and maximum freedom to obtain and report that information, been effective in meeting both the needs of the people and the best interests of the combat effort? Marshall presented an example of the reporting effort in his consideration of the battle for Landing Zone (LZ) Bird on 25 December 1966. He wrote:

What has been written about the brave fight at LZ Bird must also stand on its own. No American or foreign correspondents got up to the position. None visited Camp Radcliff to do interviews about the operation. The Pentagon and MAC-V (Military Assistance Command-Vietnam) headquarters, though interested, still have not anything more than the foggiest notion of what happened.

⁴⁸ Melvin R. Laird [Secretary of Defense], Memorandum to the Press, March 1969, pp. 1-2.

The fight won headlines on the following day in the national press. The stories were based on what hard-pressed bureau chiefs in Saigon had to assume out of the scant information fed them by telephone from the field. As reported, the fight at Bird was a defeat for the United States, no simple reverse, and hardly short of disaster. A solidly placed and defended landing zone had been overrun. The enemy had had his way. Our losses, compared to theirs, were mournful. Within 24 hours thereafter, the fight at LZ Bird had passed from the public consciousness as the press ran on to other sensations.

It may therefore be pertinent to quote Senior Captain Phuc [a North Vietnamese officer captured during the battle]:

"The 9th Battalion was supposed to destroy several of the gun positions. But it was repelled and forced to withdraw from LZ Bird 30 minutes after the attack started. The 8th Battalion stayed on the target one hour. However, its attack was quickly disorganized, few of the missions were carried out, and the withdrawal was greatly confused. The demolitions expert from Sao Vang called Major Phuong and told him that eight of the guns had been destroyed. We felt good only about that."

Here we have it. A regiment, aiming at a soft mark, got the hell kicked out of it. A dynamiter told a whopper to justify the claim of a partial success. In truth, only one gun had been destroyed.

. . . So the 22nd Regiment remained unhurt, and its men came on strong, most of them outfitted with helmets, knapsacks, boots, entrenching tools, and sheath knives, besides firearms. They carried ample ammunition for their personal weapons. Among other fighting supplies, they abandoned on the battlefield eight satchel charges, seven bangalore torpedoes, 250 hand grenades, three cases of rifle grenades, 25 81-mm. mortar rounds, 30 60-mm. mortar rounds, and 20 B-40 rockets, to attest to the haste and disorganization of the withdrawal.

Not one U.S. motor vehicle was destroyed, though

17 tires were cut through. All the 105-mm. howitzers were in action by the following day. Besides one 155-mm. howitzer ruined, two had to be lifted over to LZ Hammond for minor repairs.

The 22nd Regiment had to fragment into platoon- and squad-size elements in an attempt to escape the retaliatory pursuit of the First Cavalry Division. Yet this breakdown did not save it. Between the moment when the first mortar round was fired and the hour of New Year's Eve, when a new truce began, thereby terminating the chase, the NVA [North Vietnamese Army] regiment lost 265 killed. That figure approximates one-third of its strength at the start. In the same period, overall losses by the First Cavalry Division were 58 KIA [killed in action] and 77 WIA [wounded in action].

Given these statistics and told at last that only one gun had been destroyed, the dour Captain Phuc gave his judgment:

"It was a disastrous defeat for our side."⁴⁹

It is left to the reader to classify this situation as an example of position or factual reporting and, also, whether the interests of the American people have been served in the reporting of this combat action as a defeat. Needless to say, the final statement of defeat given by Nguyen Song Phuc, Senior Captain, Plans and Training Officer, 22nd Regiment of the Sao Vang Division, North Vietnamese Army, did not change the story, as noted by Marshall,

⁴⁹S. L. A. Marshall, Bird: The Christmas-Tide Battle (New York: Cowles, 1968), pp. 193-96.

that "the fight at Bird was a defeat for the United States, no simple reverse, and hardly short of disaster" and that American "losses, compared to theirs, were mournful."

This fraud upon the American people speaks for itself in a consideration of the performance of the media as they participate in a system of voluntary cooperation. It again remains for the reader to decide if the media, in this instance, have been lacking both in terms of providing the truth to United States citizens and acting in the best interests of the United States.

Without question, a single story may be viewed in a perspective different from that of a series of fraudulent reports. The purpose of Chapter IV is to examine the reporting of combat events over a specific time period to determine if the performance in the Vietnam combat zone, as noted above, was an exception or the rule.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to examine media performance by conducting a content analysis of two combat actions as reported in three of the nation's leading newspapers. These newspapers--The New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and The Kansas City Star--were examined in light of three of the common criticisms of the press outlined in Chapter II. The combat events selected are considered to be crisis events with an intense psychological impact potential and, therefore, the selection of these events resulted in a negation of the second criticism (crisis reporting). Also, this writer's opinion that the media should not be required to slant the news to the government's favor negated the fifth criticism (not on the team). The analysis was thus limited to consideration of the validity of the remaining three criticisms: position reporting, uninformed reporting, and erroneous reporting.

It must also be noted that this analysis was

restricted to the reports that appeared in the news columns, with no comment being made on the material and/or political positions which appeared in the editorial columns or in stories identified as news analysis. This restriction was appropriate since, in the area of position reporting, opinion properly labeled as opinion is a suitable element of the editorial page or the news analysis. This is especially so as these are the means by which the media perform one of their critical functions.

The periods utilized for analysis were:

1. The Tet Offensive: 30 January 1968 through 14 February 1968. Obviously, this is only the initial period of the combat action, but a review of the total reporting effort was not feasible as comment on this period continues to the present time. This initial period, however, allowed conclusions on media performance during a critical period in which the opinions of the event were being formed by the public.

2. The Battle of Ap Bia Mountain: 19-29 May 1969. The total reporting effort of this event is included within these dates.

Each news story on the two combat events, as it

appeared daily in each of the three newspapers, was analyzed in terms of position reporting, uninformed reporting, and erroneous reporting. The criteria established for analysis of news content were:

1. Position Reporting

a. The headline presented, which should summarize the story in a few lines, is not fully supported by the content of the story.

b. The story, after noting basic facts of the event, presents direct quotations with the implication that they are the consensus concerning the event rather than individual opinion.

c. The story presents statements which appeal to the emotions but does not indicate the premise on which the individual's conclusions are based.

d. The story consists totally of negative elements of the reported event, with no attempt at balance by commenting on existing positive aspects.

e. The story reports events which may have obvious and rational explanations that are not stated so the story may be presented in the negative view.

f. The placement of the news story in the news

columns is such that the story may be construed as a comment on adjacent news stories.

g. Inclusion of news reports from Hanoi which directly, without comment, state the North Vietnamese view of events.

2. Uninformed Reporting: The story content indicates the reporter has engaged in superficial reporting because of a lack of knowledge of the Vietnam situation. Admittedly this is a vague area in which it is difficult to determine when a reporter is or is not informed in regard to intricacies of the United States-Vietnam situation. Criticism, therefore, was restricted to flagrant inadequacy of statements in the area of governmental policy, military organization or tactics, and geographical fact.

3. Erroneous Reporting: The story contains a factual error which is determined by correction in later reports, comment by governmental announcement, or notation and criticism by other publications.

Comment on the individual news story, if considered necessary, is followed by the specific criticism of the reporting effort. If the news story appeared to be an example of responsible journalism and was not criticized,

the comment "No criticism" is entered.

THE TET OFFENSIVE

30 January 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. No news report.

The New York Times. VIETCONG ATTACK 7 CITIES, ALLIES CALL OFF TET TRUCE, Tom Buckley, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. Initial report of the offensive. Well reported except for the statement: "American sources seemed dismayed by the success of the closely coordinated attacks." To what extent American sources were dismayed may be questioned. Nevertheless, no criticism.

The Kansas City Star. BIGGEST DRIVE BY REDS, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. Initial report of the offensive. No criticism.

31 January 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. VIETNAM REPORT, Saigon, p. 1.

Initial report of the offensive. No criticism.

The New York Times. FOE INVADES U.S. EMBASSY; RAIDERS WIPED OUT AFTER 6 HOURS; VIETCONG WIDEN ATTACK ON CITIES, Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. Story indicates the attacks were a surprise to the

Americans: "There were no tanks or heavy weapons to meet the enemy." With only a minimum amount of available information, it seems inappropriate to state the attacks were a surprise. Also, after the event, one may ask why specific weapons were not placed at specific points in the cities. Position reporting.

JOHNSON RECEIVES FLOW OF REPORTS, Special to The New York Times, Washington, p. 1. No criticism.

EMBASSY OPENED IN SEPTEMBER, WAS BUILT TO THWART ATTACKS, Joseph B. Treaster, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 2. Story quotes Frank J. Martin, embassy architect: "Security is our primary consideration here. We'll be able to withstand just about any type of minor attack." Also, it states that the building was constructed at a cost of \$2.6-million, "almost triple the original estimate." In the midst of the enemy offensive, this story combines the deriding of the architect with concern for the construction cost overrun. Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. SIEGE ON EMBASSY A FIGHT TO LAST RED, Associated Press, Peter Arnett, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

FIGHTING EBBS IN THE CAPITAL, Star's Press Service, Saigon, p. 1. Reports on the execution of a South

Vietnamese officer and his family by the Viet Cong.

At one point in the Saigon fighting guerrillas dragged a South Vietnamese captain, his wife and their two children from their home, lined them against a wall and executed them. They left the bodies in a ditch.

No criticism.

HARD TASK TO DEFEND U.S. SITES IN VIETNAM, John R. Cauley, Washington, p. 13A. No criticism.

SAIGON LONG A TARGET, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 5C. No criticism.

1 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. THE GREAT SAIGON MYSTERY: WAS THE U.S. EMBASSY CAPTURED?, Saigon, p. 1. Story reports the initial confusion on what was occurring in Saigon. "One aspect of the Saigon surprise assault was crystal clear, however. The prestige of the United States had suffered a mighty blow." The story lead implies that the embassy, in fact, was captured. Also, rather than reporting on the actual fighting, the reporter considered it necessary to comment on the prestige of the United States. Position reporting.

The New York Times. VIETCONG PRESS GUERRILLA RAIDS; MARTIAL LAW DECLARED BY THIEU; JOHNSON WEIGHTS NEW ASIA STEPS,

Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1.

Story reports that a government soldier removed his uniform and tossed it over a wall.

The uniform sailed back over the wall, apparently thrown by residents who wanted no part of a Government symbol on their grounds. . . . In one suburb, northwest of the capital, South Vietnamese sources reported families were serving meals to guerrillas who had routed police forces from the area.

Did the South Vietnamese citizens do these things out of fear for their lives or, as implied, because they rejected their government and were willingly cooperating with the Viet Cong? The tone of the report is of the latter. Position reporting.

VILLAGE ENDURES NIGHT OF TERROR, Gene Roberts, Special to The New York Times, Danang, p. 1. No criticism.

EMBASSY ATTACK; A FIGHT TO THE DEATH, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 14. No criticism.

ENEMY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS REPORTED FORMED IN SAIGON, Reuters, Tokyo, p. 14. No criticism.

The Kansas City Star. TERROR RISES IN VIETNAM--REDS 'GO FOR BROKE,' Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. A well reported story of the continuing battle in Saigon. Contains the following comments:

A mother and her six children were machine-gunned to

death as they hid behind sandbags when the Viet Cong overran the army compound in which they lived. Their father, the commander of an armored unit training center, was beheaded. A Vietnamese major returned to his base camp to find his wife and children executed by the Viet Cong. He carried the body of his small daughter from the camp, tears streaming down his eyes. . . . Vietnamese marines captured a Viet Cong officer armed with a pistol near the An Quang Pagoda and brought him to Brig. Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan, controversial chief of South Vietnam's national police. Loan grabbed him, put a pistol shot through his head, and in English told newsmen standing nearby: "They killed many Americans and many of my men."

This story balances the "Loan execution story" with executions of women and children by the Viet Cong. No criticism.

2 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. THE HORROR OF SAIGON, Saigon,

p. 1.

One sad Vietnamese told this writer, in what may well be one of the greatest understatements in East Asian history, "This is a terrible loss of face for the government. Many people are very discouraged."

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker was somewhat less cheerful in the face of adversity. He guessed Saigon "was now secure," he said, amid explosions that echoed outside his office. "Certainly none of these attacks have been successful," he added, though he did not define success.

President Thieu announced, "Our armed forces have had the situation under control from the very outset." Snipers, however, kept his helicopter from landing at the presidential palace in the middle of Saigon.

This report appears to be an exercise in "see how detached

the officials are from the reality of the situation"!

Perhaps, in a difficult situation, the officials should proclaim loud cries of imminent defeat? Positive statements are expected, yet they are derided. Position reporting.

THE SOUTH VIETNAM DISASTER: FACT AND FICTION WRITTEN IN BLOOD, Saigon, p. 2. This story:

1. Reports that the reason for the "little actual fact" and contradictory information coming from Vietnam was because of the disruption of civilian press and radio facilities.
2. Notes that Premier Nguyen Van Loc had imposed press censorship that left the country without civilian newspapers.
3. Gives examples of combat actions occurring during this period.

The story is balanced, unbiased, and well reported. However, the headline indicates "disaster" which is not justified by the story content. Position reporting.

The New York Times. A RESOLUTE STAND, Max Frankel, Special to The New York Times, Washington, p. 1. No criticism.

ENEMY TOLL SOARS, Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. "This is a terrible loss of face

for the government, Many people are very discouraged." Those words are attributed to "an informed Vietnamese," but there is no indication within the report as to whether the opinion is a consensus of the Vietnamese people or the opinion of one man. The implication given is that it is a consensus. Position reporting.

VIETCONG ATTACKS SHOCK WASHINGTON, Tom Wicker,
Special to The New York Times, Washington, p. 1.

"What happened?" one Senator demanded. "I thought we were supposed to be winning this war." "This is really disturbing," a Southern Democratic member of Congress said. "We've been led to believe we were on top of things militarily and past the stage when we were subject to this kind of thing."

No quotes are included in this report from Senators who might feel that a counterattack is possible at any time provided the enemy wishes to expend the resources. Position reporting.

HANOI SAYS AIM OF RAIDS IS TO OUST SAIGON REGIME,
Special to The New York Times, Hong Kong, p. 1. No criticism.

GAINS STRESSED IN HANOI, Agence France-Presse,
Hanoi, p. 12.

The psychological impact of the surprise offensive on the people in the South is likely to prove considerable. Scarcely less important could be the reaction

abroad, in the United States in particular.

For American public opinion, the facts would appear to have belied the official optimism that has been current.

The official view of the government of North Vietnam presented by United States media. Is there any possibility they would evaluate events in their own favor? Position reporting.

OFFENSIVE IS SAID TO PINPOINT ENEMY'S STRENGTH:
DESPITE U.S. STRESS ON TOLL, VIETCONG GAINS ARE SEEN IN
MORALE AND "PRESTIGE," Tom Buckley, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 12.

Among the points that the attacks may have demonstrated are these:

Despite official statistics to the contrary, no part of the country is secure either from terrorist bombs or from organized military operations.

Even local guerrilla battalions, as distinct from the main force, still possess highly efficient communications, leadership and coordination

Most important, after years of fighting and tens of thousands of casualties, the Vietcong can still find thousands of men who are ready not only to strike at night and slip away but also to undertake missions in which death is the only possible outcome.

By and large, the South Vietnamese armed forces have not clearly demonstrated such an extreme dedication to duty.

Some observers feel that the attacks may put into

doubt the wisdom of the American military policy of sending tens of thousands of the most effective combat troops into the empty border regions to hunt, almost always unsuccessfully, for North Vietnamese units while leaving the defenses of populated areas to the South Vietnam Army, militia and police.

While enemy units fought their way to the center of Pleiku, the two brigades of the Fourth Infantry Division assigned to the area--some 12,000 men--were patrolling the ridges and jungle to the west within 15 miles of the Cambodian border.

The Vietcong's choice of the new American Embassy as a major target appeared to indicate an attempt at humiliation. To the extent that the guerrillas blasted their way through the stone wall and fought from the compound for six hours, the attempt succeeded.

Rather than dispute this story paragraph by paragraph, it should be sufficient to note that this negative approach could not have been more effectively prepared by a North Vietnamese psychological warfare technician. Position reporting.

U.S. CIVILIANS IN SAIGON STALK SNIPERS NEAR HOMES,
Associated Press, Saigon, p. 13.

The group said American helicopters had been making frequent machine-gun and rocket flights over the heavily populated civilian area behind them. . . . "The civilian casualties over there must be fantastic," said Mr. Fleming. . . . The Americans have seen no Vietnamese policemen or troops since early Wednesday morning. One of them commented: "If the Vietnamese won't defend their capital, what will they defend?"

This story implies that United States forces had engaged in

indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population in Saigon and, further, that South Vietnamese forces were lacking in motivation to fight for their country. Position reporting.

FOE IS SAID TO EXECUTE 2 G.I.'S BEFORE CROWD, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 13. No criticism.

Page 12 of this issue had three photographs of General Loan shooting a Viet Cong officer, but this was balanced by a photograph of a South Vietnamese officer carrying the body of his child who had been executed by the Viet Cong. No criticism.

The Kansas City Star. INSURGENTS HOLDING OUT, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

V.C. KILL FIVE MISSIONARIES, Associated Press, New York, p. 1. No criticism.

3 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. BLOOD BATH IN VIETNAM: HORRIBLE DESTRUCTION OF HUE, Saigon, p. 1. Story reports in these words on the continuing battle:

President Nguyen Van Thieu announced triumphantly over the radio, "The back of the Viet Cong attack has been broken. We can consider they have been totally defeated." His listeners, whoever and wherever they were in Saigon, could scarcely hear his voice because of the gunfire.

The reporter appears to be making the implication that the President of South Vietnam cannot be believed. Position reporting.

VIETNAM ROUNDUP--REACTIONS FROM HOME AND ABROAD,
Washington, p. 3.

Senator Charles Percy (Rep.-Ill.) is reported as having earlier credited the Viet Cong with "winning a tremendous psychological victory." This was denied by President Johnson, who described the raids "a complete failure."

Senator Percy is quoted: "The fact that the Viet Cong could mount as many attacks as they have demonstrates the great strength they have. What we have been told about the strength of the enemy--their weakening position--is simply not true."

Senator Percy presents the negative view with a minor comment from the administration. The thrust of the article is that our forces have failed while the Viet Cong have scored a tremendous victory. Position reporting.

The New York Times. JOHNSON SAYS FOE'S RAIDS ARE A FAILURE MILITARILY; SAIGON, HUE BATTLES GO ON, Tom Buckley, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

6 U.S. MISSIONARIES KILLED BY VIETCONG, p. 1. No criticism.

WARNING IS GIVEN, Max Frankel, Special to The New York Times, Washington, p. 1. No criticism.

ENEMY MAINTAINS TIGHT GRIP ON HUE, Gene Roberts,
Special to The New York Times, Hue, p. 1. No criticism.

GUERRILLA MOTIVATION STRESSED: THE VC ARE NOT
AFRAID TO DIE, Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times,
Saigon, p. 9.

"The VC are not afraid to die," said the official in a matter-of-fact manner. The courage and motivation of the guerrilla units that struck Saigon, Danang, the provincial capitals and many other towns and installations were important factors in the havoc they created.

. . . the Viet Cong almost always fight without "supporting fire" from artillery and aircraft, and fight well. They do even better as the odds against them decrease.

But the crisis has not apparently been met by any high degree of patriotic fervor or commitment by the urban population. The people of South Vietnam appear to be cynical and tired of this war.

Again, a story that would do credit to a psychological warfare technician. Position reporting.

MANY AT U.N. VIEW U.S. AS A CONFUSED GOLIATH, Drew Middleton, Special to The New York Times, United Nations, p. 9. No criticism.

U.S. WIVES CALM AS SAIGON ERUPTS, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 10. No criticism.

The Kansas City Star. FIERCE BLOWS BY REDS, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

DISPUTE ON STRENGTH OF RED FOE, Associated Press,
Washington, p. 1.

Senator Mike Mansfield indicates that he doesn't
subscribe to General Westmoreland's theory that the
"Viet Cong terrorists are running out of steam."

Agreeing with Mansfield, Senator Frank Church (Dem.-
Idaho) said if the raids were a last gasp effort by the
Viet Cong, "we are struggling with a mighty lively
corpse."

A most negative view of the situation, with no comment from
General Westmoreland. Position reporting.

4 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. No news report.

The New York Times. VIETCONG HOLDING POSITION ON EDGE OF
SAIGON AIRPORT, Tom Buckley, Special to The New York Times,
Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

BY BUS, BY TRUCK, ON FOOT, FOE BUILT FORCES IN
SAIGON, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

U.S. MARINES SEIZE A 3D BLOCK OF HUE, Gene Roberts,
Special to The New York Times, Hue, p. 1. No criticism.

WAR CRISSCROSSES SUBURB OF SAIGON, Charles Morh,
Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 5. The story
quotes a United States Marine Corps captain as having made
the following observations:

We're moving and they're dug in. You are bound to lose people this way and have nothing to show for it. We'll take this village eventually, but so what? The irony of all this just drives me into the ground.

Is this the opinion of one officer or the consensus of United States military forces in Vietnam? Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. FIGHT IN CLOSE QUARTERS, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

VIET CONG RODE FLOWER-LADEN TRUCKS INTO CELEBRATING SAIGON, Peter Arnett, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 15A. No criticism.

5 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. A PARALYZED CITY: THE REIGN OF TERROR CONTINUES, Saigon, p. 1.

Saigon the "secure," Saigon the "safe," Saigon the "civilized" capital of South Vietnam still looked like a deserted and horror-stricken battlefield during last weekend.

The people of this great city were terror-stricken, --fearful that they could be suddenly set upon and chopped to pieces by roving bands of Viet Cong. Or just as bad, frightened to death that they would be shot in the head for no apparent reason by South Vietnam's beer-swilling Chief of the Secret Police, Brigadier Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan. (Incidentally, good old American Middle-West beer seems to be the Chief's favorite brew, a can of which he always carries around in his left hand while clutching his smoking and deadly pistol in his right.)

Police and soldiers were given instructions to shoot on sight any civilians on the streets after 7:00 P.M.

A series of execution stakes were erected for captured Viet Cong guerrillas "but many, when they did surrender, were shot on the spot."

Brigadier General Philip Davidson, chief of intelligence for the American forces, shot down all the optimistic statements by his superiors last week by telling reporters that a second Viet Cong offensive even more powerful than the one that had already turned most South Vietnamese cities into slaughter houses might start at almost any time.

A blatant example of events twisted to the view of the reporter. General Davidson's prediction, as even most civilians would be aware, was an intelligence estimate on a probable enemy course of action. Position reporting.

IS 'WESTY' IN TROUBLE? FLEET STREET ASKS, p. 1.

Three British papers are quoted thus: "Westmoreland must bear the responsibility for the obvious under-estimate of VC strength and for misleading President Johnson on the progress of the war." The assumption is that General Westmoreland underestimated Viet Cong strength and misled the President on the progress of the war. These assumptions, despite popular opinion, have not been established as fact. Position reporting.

THE HORROR OF HUE: 'I HOPE I'LL GET OUT OF HERE ALIVE,' From Our Correspondent, Hue, p. 2. No criticism.

CASUALTY REPORT, p. 2. Comments on friendly and enemy casualties. "Claims of more than 10,000 VC dead were discounted by reporters used to the inflated claims of the Thieu government." While questioning the honesty of the governmental announcement, the reporter admits the claim was discounted by the reporters. No criticism.

The New York Times. 2 VIETNAMESE AT EMBASSY SAID TO HAVE AIDED ATTACK, Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

ATTACK ON HUE FAILS TO ROUT FOE, Gene Roberts, Special to The New York Times, Hue, p. 1. No criticism.

ENEMY ARTILLERY AND GROUND FORCE ASSAULT KHESANH, Tom Buckley, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

34 RESCUED BY G.I.'S AT MISSION IN DALAT, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

U. S. CAUTIONING SAIGON ON CAPTIVE TREATMENT, Agence France-Presse, Saigon, p. 14. No criticism.

OUTRAGE AND HORROR IN EUROPE TEMPERED BY SOME SYMPATHY FOR U.S., Anthony Lewis, Special to The New York Times, London, p. 16.

The Sun, a pro-Labor paper, printed a picture of Vietcong bodies laid out in Danang for villagers to see.

The caption said of the South Vietnamese, who had ordered the display, "Are these the allies of Western Civilization?"

. . . A correspondent wrote of its effect: "Shots of combat in Saigon, a glimpse of a G.I. emptying a clip into a prone Vietcong, refugees fleeing with babies in arms, General Westmoreland apparently laughing at the boom of mortars--all this brought some viewers to tears."

The fact that some viewers were moved to tears undoubtedly was quite pleasing to the North Vietnamese government.

Position reporting.

VC SAY WAR IS IN A NEW STAGE, Special to The New York Times, Hong Kong, p. 16. No criticism.

SAIGON APPEALS FOR REFUGEE AID, Reuters, Saigon, p. 16. No criticism.

The Kansas City Star. NEW FIGHT IN SAIGON, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

SENATORS FEAR LOSSES, Associated Press, Washington, p. 2.

Senator Kennedy is quoted as stating the Viet Cong "achieved an outstanding political victory" and Senator Mansfield indicated it was time for "very serious talks" with the Saigon government. Senator Javits (Rep.-New York) said the guerrilla raids on South Vietnam cities had proven the existence of a military stalemate. He urged new peace moves keyed to that point.

No basis is given for Senator Kennedy's assessment of an "outstanding political victory" or Senator Javits'

conclusion of a "military stalemate"--a conclusion, incidentally, which the North Vietnamese would prefer to that of continual progress on the part of the United States. No comment is presented from the administration on these critical concessions of political victory and stalemate. Position reporting.

6 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. SPECIAL BACKGROUND REPORT: THE U. S. IN VIETNAM; LIFE AMIDST THE DUNG HEAPS, Saigon, p. 1.

The report quotes Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky that the situation in general had improved. "One sour observer, between explosions, commented, 'I hope the situation has not improved elsewhere like it has improved in Saigon.'" After noting that Ky assured refugees that food was available in Saigon, the release stated: "People still sorted through the mountains of garbage looking for anything edible." This news story goes on to report that International Red Cross Secretary General Henrik Beer indicated that "it was about time" security screening at the United States Embassy was improved. "He had been allowed to walk right into the building without being either stopped or questioned." After degrading Ky, the reporter questioned the security screening

at the United States Embassy. No indication is made of the number of visits Beer, a Caucasian, may have made previously to the Embassy, which, of course, would permit his entry, upon recognition by security personnel, without his being stopped or questioned. Position reporting.

The New York Times. U.S. MARINES IN HUE DRIVE WEDGE INTO ENEMY UNITS, Gene Roberts, Special to The New York Times, Hue, p. 1. No criticism.

KY SAYS REGIME WILL ARM PUBLIC, Tom Buckley, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

STREETS OF SAIGON SHELLLED IN DRIVE TO ROUT VIETCONG, Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. This report quotes an American: "Saigon will never be the same." A Canadian officer from the International Control Commission is also quoted: "I think Hanoi is probably a safer place than Saigon this week." Both quotes are the personal opinions of individuals and may have little relation to the facts of the situation. Nevertheless, both statements would be welcomed by the North Vietnamese government. Position reporting.

CIVILIAN TOLL HIGH IN MEKONG DELTA, Associated Press, Can Tho, p. 14. No criticism.

ENEMY ATTACK DESCRIBED, Agence France-Presse, Hue,
p. 14. This report, written by a French reporter who was in
a section of Hue held by the North Vietnamese, noted:

. . . there was no doubt that they were the victors.
Many young people in civilian clothes and riding motor-
bikes came Friday to talk to them. Later others brought
food in large quantities. There was no constraint in
their gestures.

This story makes a strong implication that the people of
South Vietnam were supporting the North Vietnamese as vic-
tors. Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. FLEE NEW VIET BATTLES, Associated
Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

SIFT ATTACK STRATEGY, John R. Cauley, Star's Wash-
ington Bureau, p. 2A. No criticism.

7 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. PX, IF NOT PEACE, RETURNS TO
SAIGON, Saigon, p. 1. Story comments on the continuing
battle and is well reported until the last paragraph:

The Army opened its huge Post Exchange in Cholon and
lines soon formed at six checkout counters. Said one
officer as he staggered off with a huge case of beer:
"They can shut down the air base and stop the airlines
running, but they've got to keep the PX open. It's the
soul of the Americans overseas."

It appears from the headline and the last paragraph that

American forces spend their time at the post exchange rather than fighting enemy forces. Also, use of the term "huge" to describe a case of beer was an unnecessary embellishment.

Position reporting.

The New York Times. TENSION IN CAPITAL IS HIGH, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

14 MORE BLOCKS RETAKEN, Gene Roberts, Special to The New York Times, Hue, p. 1. No criticism.

FOE, USING TANKS FIRST TIME, MAULS OUTPOST NEAR DMZ, Tom Buckley, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

KONTUM EXPELS INVADING FORCES, Special to The New York Times, Kontum, p. 14. No criticism.

TRI QUANG SAID TO BAR VIETCONG APPEAL FOR AID, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 14. No criticism.

MOST OF THE MISSIONARIES IN VIETNAM GROUP ARE SAFE, United Press International, Saigon, p. 14. No criticism.

FRENCHMAN IN SAIGON TELLS HOW FOE RECRUITED YOUTHS, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 14. No criticism.

A NEW PHASE IN VIETCONG PUSH IS SEEN BY OBSERVERS IN HANOI, Agence France-Presse, Hanoi, p. 15. No criticism.

WESTMORELAND WARNS OF RAIDS, Associated Press,

Saigon, p. 15. No criticism.

U.S. CONCERNED BY FOE'S THREAT TO RETALIATE FOR ANY EXECUTIONS, Bernard Weinraub, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 15. No criticism.

FRONT SEES FIERCER FIGHTING, Special to The New York Times, Moscow, p. 15. No criticism.

CIVILIAN WOUNDED JAM HOSPITAL; BOY SCOUTS CARRYING STRETCHERS, Thomas A. Johnson, Special to The New York Times, Danang, p. 16. No criticism.

Page 1 of this issue has a photograph of three young children standing in a pile of debris. The caption: "Children in Cholon district of Saigon forming a bucket brigade yesterday to put out fire in what remains of father's machine shop, leveled by air strikes." Reader easily equates the destruction as being caused primarily by air-strikes and not by the Viet Cong strike. Position reporting. The Kansas City Star. LAUNCHING A VAST 'RECOVERY' EFFORT, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

CITY CAMPAIGN WANES, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

HAD TO DOOM A CITY, Peter Arnett, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 3B. This story reports on the use of bombers,

artillery, and fighter aircraft utilizing napalm to rout out communist forces. "It became necessary to destroy the town to save it," a United States major was quoted. This quote makes sense if one is aware that enemy forces are the objective of military power and structures are of secondary importance. However, the quote is easily taken as an example of the destruction of the people and the countryside while attempting to save them from the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. Position reporting.

8 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. CIVILIAN DAY, MILITARY NIGHTS, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

SPECIAL REPORT - A NEW SECRET DEFENSE AGENCY IN WASHINGTON, Russell Baker, Defense Correspondent, Washington, p. 3. This report explores the rapidity in which the government announced that the enemy had taken a fierce beating and the issuance of enemy dead 10 to 13 times the allied casualties. Identifies the Office of Optimistic Prognosis (OOP), whose mission is stated as "to win the war in the press and to keep it won there until the American military can figure out how to do it at the scene in Vietnam."

Someone in the Pentagon had added all the "body

count" figures issued by OOP since early 1965 and discovered that they totaled nearly three times the population of both Vietnams. A sharp memo was rocketed to O'Mason's desk. "You're placing the President in danger of having to explain why, since we have already killed everybody in Vietnam three times, we still need an army there," it said.

A farcical account which did this country no service in a critical period. Position reporting.

The New York Times. LATEST SOVIET TANKS USED BY ENEMY NEAR KHESANH, William Beacher, Special to The New York Times, Washington, p. 1.

Discussing the general situation, one ranking officer said: "We're convinced they can't take Khesanh. If they make a determined effort, their losses may go as high as 10,000 killed. Our losses? Maybe 500 killed."

Militarily, a kill ratio of 1:20 is highly acceptable. But not so acceptable to the 500 who are actually killed, to their families, or the public who may be called upon to be one of the 500. Position reporting.

ALLIED POST FALLS TO TANK ASSAULT NEAR BUFFER ZONE, Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

GENERAL CITES FOE'S LOSSES, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 14. No criticism.

SURVIVORS HUNT DEAD OF BENTRE, TURNED TO RUBBLE IN ALLIED RAIDS, Bernard Weinraub, Special to The New York

Times; Bentre, p. 14.

. . . Mrs. Dieu Thi Sam sat stunned in the bombed wreckage of her home and wept. She pointed to the sky. "The first bomb landed on the next house," she said in Vietnamese. "I ran down the street and began to cry. My house exploded. I keep crying. I cannot stop."

Four hamlets thought to be controlled by the Viet Cong have been raked by allied bombing and artillery attacks and fire from armed helicopters. Near the canal, still fringed with pines and mango trees, is an area of town where a zig-zag row of bricks is the only remnant of two-story and three-story houses.

At the 350-bed hospital, the maimed and wounded filled the beds and floors and aisles. The market place is rubble and near the gutted homes nearby women in shawls sit in the noon heat and mourn with loud groans.

Again, the report concerns destruction of the people and of the town by allied raids, with the enemy not being mentioned.

Position reporting.

MAJOR DESCRIBES MOVE, Associated Press, Bentre, p. 14.

"It became necessary to destroy the town to save it," a United States major said today. He was talking about the decision by allied commanders to bomb and shell the town regardless of civilian casualties to rout the Vietcong.

Reference comment made on The Kansas City Star, 7 February 1968 (pages 118-19). Position reporting.

TWO SOUTH KOREANS MISSING IN SAIGON AREA HELD BY FOE, Reuters, South Vietnam, p. 14. No criticism.

FOE IN SAIGON SAYS HE WILL 'RECONQUER' CAPITAL AND NATION, Agence France-Presse, Saigon, p. 14.

You can clearly see that the people are with us. No special precautions had been taken to assure the safety of the leaders who spoke with Westerners. With only side arms, the Vietcong leaders had been going freely from house to house.

This report implies that the Viet Cong were accepted by the population in Saigon. Position reporting.

MARINE SQUAD RIDES TO BATTLE ON MOTORCYCLES, Gene Roberts, Special to The New York Times, Hue, p. 14.

Down the street came a squad of marines zipping off to battle on red, blue and yellow Honda motorcycles they had "liberated" from recaptured middle-class homes.

Today a marine "liberated" a case of pastel-colored pocket combs and passed them around to members of his platoon.

This report alludes to looting on the part of United States Marine Corps personnel with the unstated implication of this type of conduct. Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. No news report.

9 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. VIETNAM REPORT, Saigon, p. 2. A well reported story on the continuing battle. However, it comments, "Hotel guests in downtown Saigon carried their cocktails to rooftops to watch the war." How the public

received this comment may be questionable. Nevertheless, no criticism.

The New York Times. 56 MARINES DIE IN BATTLES IN TENSE NORTHERN SECTOR, Bernard Weinraub, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1.

In downtown Saigon, as the curfew went into effect, hotel guests carried cocktails to the roofs to watch the war. They could see columns of gray smoke curled away from patches of houses in the Southwest. The thunder of Government artillery pieces in the Northwest seemed closer than usual.

Comment as noted for story preceding this one. The implication here, however, is that guests watched the destruction of Saigon by governmental artillery. Position reporting.

ROCKET AND GROUND ATTACK, Reuters, Saigon, p. 16.

No criticism.

INTELLIGENCE MOTIVE SEEN, Saigon, p. 16. No criticism.

SEIZURE OF LANG VEI HAILED, Agence France-Presse, Hanoi, p. 16. No criticism.

WAR-ENDING VICTORY SEEN AS AIM OF ENEMY'S DRIVE, Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

KENNEDY ASSERTS U.S. CANNOT WIN, Tom Wicker, Special to The New York Times, Washington, p. 1.

"It is time to face the reality that a military victory is not in sight and that it will probably never come." This statement is Senator Robert F. Kennedy's and he goes on to note, "The Vietcong offensive hand 'finally shattered the mask of official illusion' about the war because it had demonstrated that no part or person of South Vietnam was secure against attack." Further, Mr. Kennedy indicted the Saigon regime for "the enormous corruption which pervades every level of South Vietnamese official life."

This report contains no comment on the government position and the reader is not given the Senator's premises so that validity of his statements may be judged. Position reporting.

THIEU IN TEARS, ORDERS STEPPED-UP MOBILIZATION,

United Press International, Saigon, p. 16.

President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam, in a speech during which he wept in speaking of his country's losses, announced today a speeded-up mobilization of military forces and other emergency measures.

The story headline, if the reader does not read the story, implies that President Thieu was in tears because he had to mobilize his nation's youth. Position reporting.

KHESANH BARS NEARLY 200 LANGVEI SURVIVORS, Associ-

ated Press, Khesanh, p. 16.

One informed source said that a high South Vietnamese official had refused to permit the refugees to be evacuated, saying the Montagnards and Laotians were not Vietnamese and thus not his concern.

A marine officer, turning back a group of 30, said:

"The Special Forces doesn't want them. What infuriates me is that the wounded are turned out too."

The impact of this story is on the callousness of certain South Vietnamese officials and United States Special Forces. No comment is made on security requirements of the Khesanh garrison. Position reporting.

EXPLANATION OFFERED, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 16. No criticism.

ENEMY'S SOVIET-DESIGNED RIFLE SLOWS MARINE DRIVE IN HUE, Gene Roberts, Hue, p. 17.

The guns blasted away at brick and mortar walls and reduced homes to rubble in this city of 145,000. "It's the only way to get them," a marine major said, "unless you want to risk losing half a platoon to get one sniper."

Again, the destruction of Vietnam by United States forces in order to fight the Viet Cong. Position reporting.

HALF SAIGON ARMY ON LEAVE FOR TET, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 17. No criticism.

The Kansas City Star. FIGHT FLARES IN SAIGON, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

TALK WAR AND PEACE, Associated Press, Tokyo, p. 1.

North Vietnam offered the United States the sword and the olive branch today on the 11th day of the biggest Communist offensive of the Vietnam war.

The peace bid was made by Nguyen Duy Trinh, foreign

minister, who said Hanoi would go to the peace table "as soon as the United States has proved that it has really stopped unconditionally the bombings and all other acts of war" against North Vietnam.

The promise of more fighting was held out by Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnam's defense minister and the victor of the 1954 battle against the French at Dien Bien Phu.

Speaking at a reception, marking the 20th anniversary of the North Korean army, Giap vowed to "fight on until we have won the final victory."

The determination of the North Vietnamese government is presented to the American people. How can Americans win when they are opposed by such resolute will? No criticism.

10 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. VIETNAM REPORT, Saigon, p. 2. No criticism.

The New York Times. G.I.'S ENTER SAIGON TO HELP ELIMINATE ENEMY HOLDOUTS, Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

U.S. GIRDING AT KHESANH TO AVOID A DIENBIENPHU, Hedrick Smith, Special to The New York Times, Washington, p. 1. No criticism.

JOHNSON HOLDS REINS, Max Frankel, Special to The New York Times, Washington, p. 1. No criticism.

MARINES GAIN IN HUE, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 10.

No criticism.

THIEU OUTLINES HIS STEPS TO MOBILIZE 65,000 MORE VIETNAMESE, Joseph B. Treaster, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 11. No criticism.

U.S. PHYSICIAN HID FROM ENEMY 8 DAYS, United Press International, Saigon, p. 11. No criticism.

LANGVEI SURVIVORS AT KHESANH BASE EVACUATED BY AIR, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 11. No criticism.

GALLUP CALLS PUBLIC DISILLUSIONED AND CYNICAL, Associated Press, Princeton, N. J., p. 12. Dr. George Gallup, who has been reporting his Gallup Poll since 1935, is interviewed. One question and answer:

Q: Dr. Gallup, how would you describe the current mood of America?

A: I think the mood of America today is one of rather great confusion and disillusionment. All the time we've been operating, 32 years now, I've never known a time like this--when people were so disillusioned and cynical. I think this goes back pretty much to their feeling of inadequacy of the leadership of our country. . . . The public wants desperately to find a way to resolve international problems without going to war.

Dr. Gallup's statements are properly reported but reinforce the lack of will in the American people. No criticism.

RATE FOR U.S. DOLLARS SCARS ON SAIGON'S BLACK MARKET, Reuters, Saigon, p. 12. No criticism.

The Kansas City Star. No news report.

11 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. No news report.

The New York Times. JET BOMBERS SEEN AT BASE IN NORTH DURING RAIDS, Tom Buckley, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

HUE TO DANANG: A PERILOUS BOAT RIDE, Gene Roberts, Special to The New York Times, Danang, p. 1. No criticism.

CIVILIAN HEROES OF WAR, Howard A. Rusk, M.D., p. 2. No criticism.

DAMAGE IN SAIGON IS LIMITED SO FAR, Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 3. No criticism.

SAIGON'S AUTHORITY BELIEVED TO BE IN CRITICAL STAGE, Bernard Weinraub, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 3.

Among the reforms that the U.S. has pressed over the last few months, and which the Saigon government has resisted, are tax increases aimed at the middle class and the wealthy, the ouster of corrupt army officials, land reform, a tougher mobilization policy that would wipe-out draft dodging, a lowering of the draft age from 20 to 18, refugee camps and a decentralization of government that would reduce the powers of military corps commanders and province officials, who are, in many cases, corrupt.

This story implies the South Vietnamese have been unwilling

to do those things which are necessary to prosecute the war. Americans, however, feel they have been contributing a disproportionate share of their taxes and youth to this effort and may be highly critical of a reticent Saigon regime. Position reporting.

BOMB SQUAD KEPT ON RUN IN SAIGON, Joseph B. Treaster, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 3. No criticism.

HANOI WARNS U.S. OF 'DIENBIENPHU' AT KHESANH, Agence France-Presse, Hanoi, p. 3. No criticism.

The Kansas City Star. SLASH AT V.C. IN SAIGON, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

12 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. DIME A HEAD FOR 250,000 REFUGEES, Saigon, p. 2. No criticism.

The New York Times. SAIGON'S SOLDIERS BATTLE BIG FORCE CLOSE TO CAPITAL, Bernard Weinraub, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

HUE'S MAYOR SAYS FOE EXECUTED 300, Thomas A. Johnson, Special to The New York Times, Hue, p. 1.

One marine private said: "This must have been once a beautiful place, everyone says it was a beautiful place. If it were not for the destruction it would look just like Bermuda."

Again, the implication of the destruction caused by the war and how it would be beautiful if war did not exist. Position reporting.

SEARCH OF A HAMLET NEAR SAIGON SHOWS NOTHING--AT FIRST, Joseph B. Treaster, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

BUDDHIST AIDE CHARGES U.S. FALSELY ACCUSED HIS SECT, Agence France-Presse, Saigon, p. 3. No criticism.

WESTMORELAND CRITICIZED FOR 'DELUDING' CONGRESS, Associated Press, Boston, p. 3. No criticism.
The Kansas City Star. PLANES ATTACK OLD HUE, Associated Press, Hue, p. 1. No criticism.

13 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. No news report.

The New York Times. G.I.'S AND VIETCONG FIGHT 2 BATTLES; MIG IS SHOT DOWN, Charles Morh, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

AT KHESANH: LIFE ON THE BULLSEYE, Associated Press, Khesanh, p. 1.

Lance Cpl. Richard Morris, 24, of North Hollywood, Calif., began playing a guitar. Two favorites that night were "500 miles" and "Where have all the flowers gone?"

A hard emphasis accompanied the part that went:
 "Where have all the soldiers gone? To the graveyard
 everyone. Oh, when will they ever learn? Oh, when will
 they ever learn?"

This story indicates the will of the individual marine is
 completely lacking. Position reporting.

U.S. MARINES ADD TO FORCES IN HUE, Thomas A. Johnson,
 Special to The New York Times, Hue, p. 3. No criticism.

G.I.'S GO IN SHOOTING TO CLEAR HAMLET NEAR SAIGON,
 Joseph B. Treaster, Special to The New York Times, Saigon,
 p. 3.

A pair of helicopters with machine guns repeatedly
 raked the smoking ruins of a hamlet on the edge of
 Saigon this morning.

"We find you lose less men when you go in shooting,"
 states an officer.

This report suggests that one unit engages in indiscriminate
 use of fire power. This event should have been reported as
 a specific incident and not so that it appears to be a
 common practice. All units do not go in shooting! Position
 reporting.

SAIGON RESUMES GARBAGE PICKUPS AFTER 2 WEEKS,
 Bernard Weinraub, Special to The New York Times, Saigon,
 p. 3. No criticism.

U.S. AIDE ASSESSES STRATEGY OF GIAP, Special to The

New York Times, Saigon, p. 4. No criticism.

P.O.W.'S IN THE SOUTH IDENTIFY THEIR UNIT AS NORTH VIETNAM'S 33D REGIMENT, Dispatch of The Times, London, p. 6.

"The Americans have proven stronger than we expected."

"But," he added quietly, "yes, the National Liberation Front will win in the end." Again, the American public is advised of the firm and resolute will of the enemy in a war Americans cannot win. Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. B-52'S BOMBING N. AR SAIGON, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

14 February 1968

San Francisco Chronicle. THE SMOKING SWILL OF SAIGON, p. 1. No criticism.

The New York Times. U.S. RUSHES 10,500 TO MEET THREAT OF VIETNAM FOE, Max Frankel, Special to The New York Times, Washington, p. 1. No criticism.

THANT SEES RESULTS IF BOMBING IS HALTED, Anthony Lewis, Special to The New York Times, London, p. 1.

Secretary General Thant believes that if the United States unconditionally stopped bombing North Vietnam for as long as two weeks, Hanoi would begin meaningful negotiations.

The cessation of the bombing, as contemporary events

illustrate, has resulted in unproductive negotiations and in freedom for the North Vietnamese to move supplies and personnel within North Vietnam. Position reporting.

13 AMERICANS DIE IN SAIGON CLASHES, Bernard Weinraub, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

MARINES AT KHESANH CLEAN RIFLES AND DIG DEEPER, Gene Roberts, Special to The New York Times, Khesanh, p. 2. No criticism.

CENSORSHIP BACK IN SAIGON, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 2. No criticism.

ARMY HONORS 27 KILLED AS FOE OPENED SAIGON ATTACK, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 2. No criticism.

MARINE GAIN IN HUE, Thomas A. Johnson, Special to The New York Times, Hue, p. 3.

The battalion Commander, Maj. Robert Thompson, said: "We fought our way up here from the jumping off point. The South Vietnamese said this area was cleared, but we had to fight our way up here."

The implication is that South Vietnamese forces cannot be trusted. Position reporting.

32,904 OF FOE DEAD IN 2 WEEKS, Reuters, Saigon, p. 3. No criticism.

ENEMY GENERAL KILLED, SAIGON SAYS, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 4. No criticism.

DESERTIONS RISE IN THE SERVICES, Associated Press, Washington, p. 4. No criticism.

PACIFICATION PROGRAM IS ALMOST AT STANDSTILL IN SOUTH VIETNAM, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 4.

In effect, South Vietnam temporarily abandoned its own countryside and the vital pacification program in a state of suspension. The urban-oriented bureaucracy and officer class responded by regrouping all the armed men they could find around the towns to guard against new attacks. A form of warlordism prevails and the commanders of the four main military regions, or army corps areas, and their provincial subordinates have considerable autonomy.

This report notes that the South Vietnamese government has redeployed its troops to the cities. While granting the importance of the pacification program, it does seem to be good sense to deploy troops to the areas in which the enemy is attacking. Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. No news report.

Summary

Analysis of the reporting of the Tet Offensive resulted in the following percentages:

San Francisco Chronicle: 70 per cent of the reports appearing in the news columns were evaluated to be examples of position reporting.

The New York Times: 26 per cent of the reports

appearing in the news columns were evaluated to be examples of position reporting.

The Kansas City Star: 13 per cent of the reports appearing in the news columns were evaluated to be examples of position reporting.

There were no cases of uninformed or erroneous reporting noted.

As indicated by the percentages above, the reality of the Tet Offensive depended primarily on what newspaper was read during this critical period of America's Vietnam involvement.

THE BATTLE OF AP BIA MOUNTAIN

19 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. BIG BATTLE FOR VIET MOUNTAIN, United Press, A Chau Valley, South Vietnam, p. 1. This initial report of the battle for Ap Bia Mountain comments on the renaming of the terrain to "Hamburger Hill" because of the bloodshed involved in taking its jungled slopes. It quotes a specialist fourth class thus: "We want it because we can't get the hell out of here until we get it." The term "Hamburger Hill" is less than a desirable name but is

properly a part of the story if it was given to the hill by the soldiers engaged in the battle and not by the reporter. The quote from the enlisted man suggests that the soldiers were motivated simply by a desire to leave the area and did knowingly or unknowingly not care about the necessity to defeat the enemy forces. This quote, which is not necessary to the story (placed at the end as if by afterthought), appears to question the will of the American soldier. There is no amplification beyond the brief quote Position reporting.

The New York Times. No news report.

The Kansas City Star. G.I.'S TAKE IT ON CHIN IN FIGHT FOR MOUNTAIN, Jay Sharbutt, Associated Press, Dong Ap Bia, Vietnam, p. 1. Again, an initial report of the battle for Ap Bia Mountain. Story contained the following quotes:

"Many cursed Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt, the hard-nosed battalion commander who sent three companies to take this 3000 foot mountain just a mile east of Laos and overlooking the shell-pocked A Shau Valley."

"'That damn Black Jack won't stop unless he kills every damn one of us,' said one of the 40 to 50 101st airborne division troopers who was wounded."

Specialist Fourth Class Anthony Toll, 20, of Nashville, Ind.: "After all these air and artillery strikes, those gooks are still in there fighting. All of us are wondering why they just can't pull back and B-52 that hill. I've lost a lot of buddies up there. Not many

guys can take it much longer."

"'Damn it, Cyclone Six, get those men spread out. They're all clustered up. You're getting paid to fight this war, not discuss it,' Honeycutt snapped over the radio at one company commander working his men up a ridgeline."

"They were too late for one medic with 8 bullet holes in him."

This report places the military commander in a light of incompetence and callousness. The implications are that the commander is assaulting the hill in order to kill his own men, that he considers them paid mercenaries, that he callously orders them forward as though they are no longer human beings, and that he would prefer spending men rather than accomplishing the mission with bomber strikes. There is no question that the report accurately presents the quotes. However, without amplification and without quotes from those present who have the opposite view, they present the military leadership in a totally negative position. Commanders do not wish their men killed; they do, however, want the mission completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the number killed in action. Soldiers who cluster together on the battlefield are inviting death, and a harsh command is to be preferred as an alternate to possible death or injury. The question of utilizing B-52's

requires additional information on aircraft availability, capabilities in this situation, and specifics on enemy forces and terrain. It is highly unlikely the specialist fourth class had this information as a basis for his statement, but the public will assume he was qualified to pose a completely valid question in asking that this operation be accomplished in a sterile demonstration of air power. Also, what purpose is served by noting that medical evacuation was too late for a soldier "with 8 bullet holes in him"? Was the reporter attempting to impress on the reader that combat is both violent and deadly? Perhaps it would also have been appropriate to describe how those eight bullets ripped and tore the soldier's flesh. Position reporting.

20 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. MOUNTAINTOP FIGHTING RAGES ON, Reuters, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

The New York Times. G.I.'S IN 10TH TRY FAIL TO ROUT FOE ON PEAK AT ASHAU, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism on this initial report of the battle. However, this report was continued to the fourth page, with the story lead noting:

PARATROOPERS FAIL AGAIN, Associated Press, A Shau Valley, p. 4. This report contained the following items:

"Many cursed Colonel Honeycutt, who sent three companies yesterday to take the mountain. They failed. 'That damn Blackjack won't stop unless he kills every damn one of us,' said one of the 40 or 50 members of the Division who were wounded."

"Damn it, Cyclone 6, get those men spread out. They're all clustered up. You're getting paid to fight this war, not discuss it [quoting Colonel Honeycutt]."

"All of us are wondering why they just can't pull back and B-52 that hill [quoting a specialist fourth class]."

The comments on pages 137-38, excepting those concerning medical evacuation, apply to this story. Position reporting. The Kansas City Star. VIET MOUNTAIN TAKEN, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 14. No criticism.

21 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. U.S. FORCES FINALLY WIN VIET HILL, Associated Press, Dong Ap Bia, Vietnam, p. 1. This report of 43 Americans killed in action and 290 wounded while taking Ap Bia quotes Major General Melvin Zais, Commander, 101st Airborne Division, as saying: "It was a great victory by a gutty bunch of guys. Real victories don't come easy." Casualties suffered during this action are a proper element of the story. However, the story takes on added significance when it is coupled with the commanding general's statement. The public is informed that 43 of their sons

have died and an implication is made that the general fights for glory in which great and real victories occur. There is no amplification beyond the basic quote. Position reporting.

KENNEDY CALLS LOSSES 'SENSELESS,' Times-Post Service, Washington, p. 1. Placed directly below the preceding story, this one reports Senator Edward Kennedy (Dem.-Mass.) as describing the losses on Hamburger Hill as "both senseless and irresponsible."

American boys are too valuable to be sacrificed by a false sense of military pride. But, more importantly [after noting that this fighting conflicts with the Administration's goals that had been stated in the Paris talks], I feel it is both senseless and irresponsible to continue to send our young men to their deaths to capture hills and positions that have no relation to ending this conflict. . . . I would ask him now to issue new orders to the field--orders that would spare American lives and perhaps advance the course of peace.

The report does balance Kennedy's statements by noting that he was challenged by Republican Whip Hugh Scott, who said that Kennedy should not try to "second guess the President" on the conduct of the war. The reporting of Kennedy's statement is proper, but the placement of the story below a report of 43 Americans killed in action may be questioned in terms of unstated emphasis. Also, within the report, no comment is made of Senator Kennedy's qualifications for making such emotion laden statements. The identification of

Americans killed in action as "senseless loss," unless Mr. Kennedy is qualified, was on the scene, and is aware of the circumstances surrounding the event, does not contribute to a resolute will on the part of citizen or soldier in continuing this conflict to a successful conclusion. Position reporting.

The New York Times. ENEMY DRIVEN FROM A SHAU PEAK IN 11TH ATTEMPT BY ALLIED FORCE, Associated Press, A Shau Valley, South Vietnam, p. 1. No criticism.

KENNEDY ASSAILS VIETNAM TACTICS, Hedrick Smith, Special to The New York Times, p. 1. Reports Senator Kennedy's charges that the bloody assaults on Ap Bia Mountain were "senseless and irresponsible" and that "American lives are too valuable to be sacrificed for military pride." This report does not present the rationale for the inflammatory statements. The statements are presented in a positive and demagogic manner--after all, what right-thinking American would condone a senseless, irresponsible sacrifice of the lives of America's own sons for the sake of military pride? Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. PEAK VICTORY IS HALLED, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. Report contained the following:

"The U.S. Command said today that the 10-day battle for 3,000 foot Dong Ap Bia appeared to be 'a real fine operation from our point of view.'"

"It was a great victory for a gutty bunch of guys [said General Zais]. Real victories don't come easy."

The American public has been informed that 43 American soldiers have been killed in a senseless and irresponsible military operation which the military command considers "a real fine operation," while the commanding general sees it as "a great victory." The placement of appropriate quotes portrays the military command as having little feeling for those killed in this action. Position reporting.

22 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. VIET HILL'S COSTLY FIGHT DEFENDED, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1. No criticism.

The New York Times. U.S. AIDES DEFEND AP BIA PEAK BATTLE, B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., Special to The New York Times, p. 1. This report presents the military reasoning for conducting the assault on Dong Ap Bia. However, it quotes a military spokesman as concluding that the operation had been "real fine." The reader may decide whether it is "real fine" that American lives were squandered or that the battle terminated as a successful operation. Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. GENERAL DEFENDS FIGHT FOR A MOUNTAIN, Associated Press, Camp Eagle, South Vietnam, p. 16. No criticism.

23 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. WHY G.I.'S TOOK A WORTHLESS HILL, Reuters, Camp Eagle, South Vietnam, p. 1. Reports the American commanding general as saying the hill had no tactical value but describing the fight as "a tremendous gallant victory." Further quoted him as stating: "The only significance of the hill was the fact that North Vietnamese were on it. The hill itself has no tactical significance." The story lead includes the term "Worthless Hill," which is not justified by the information contained within the article. Also, the report implies that the general fights for glory by attacking terrain that has no tactical value. Position reporting.

The New York Times. U.S. BATTLE LOSSES STIR NIXON AIDES-- CONTROVERSY DEVELOPING AS HIGH CIVILIAN OFFICIALS ASK DISCRETION BY MILITARY, Hendrick Smith, Special to The New York Times, Washington, D. C., p. 1.

"Some civilian officials feel that American battlefield commanders are operating with insufficient regard for the impact of the casualty figures on public opinion.

Privately, these high officials express impatience with the Saigon command for undertaking a costly operation such as the assault on Ap Bia mountain, in which nearly 50 Americans were killed and 270 wounded."--"The view of some senior civilian officials is that battlefield commanders are applying their orders 'too blindly' and with 'too little sense of proportion.'"--"High civilian officials fear that such criticism in Congress will grow unless battlefield commanders use more discretion. Ultimately, the officials are worried that the criticism will undermine public support of the war and thus shorten the Administration's time for successful negotiations in Paris. 'We are fighting a limited war,' one official said. 'Now clearly the greatest limitation is the reaction of the American public. They react to the casualty lists. I don't understand why the military doesn't get the picture. The military is defeating the very thing it most wants--more time to gain a stronger hand.'"

The statements of unidentified civilian officials give the impression the military acts on its own and not, as is in fact the case, under strict and close supervision of civilian officials. The military is not a free agent and does not receive orders from unidentified civilian officials through The New York Times, even though this is the impression given the reader. If military commanders were to conduct combat operations with the primary view of minimizing casualties rather than accomplishing the mission, each commander would have the option of refusing combat since, in his opinion, it would result in deaths that may not be acceptable to the American people. Casualties are never wanted, but, if civilian authority has given the mission order, casualties should not become the primary considera-

tion. If, again by civilian direction, they should become the primary consideration, conduct of military operations will be degraded to the point of defeat. It is interesting to note that the media, in the past, critically faulted South Vietnamese military commanders who conducted, or failed to conduct, operations with minimum casualties in order to please President Diem. Position reporting.

STRATEGY IN VIETNAM, Terence Smith, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 2.

Despite their disclaimers, commanders at all levels convey the impression that they would be disappointed if they did receive orders from the Nixon Administration to hold back. . . . They still rankle at the restrictions that were placed on them from the beginning, at the fact that they have not been permitted to pursue the enemy into base areas in neighboring Cambodia and Laos, and at the fact that the bombing of the North was halted. They realize that the war has shifted into a new phase, in which political considerations frequently outweigh military ones, but they give little evidence of welcoming the change.

This report paints the military commander as being unable to appreciate the political complexities that require limitations on the application of military power. To the contrary, most military commanders are quite able to understand that our goals will be reached only by a consideration of the most appropriate alternative in a given time period. Position reporting.

PARATROOP COMMANDER REPLIES TO KENNEDY'S CRITICISM

OF BATTLE FOR AP BIA, Iver Peterson, Special to The New York Times, Saigon, p. 3. "At least 50 Americans died in the assaults." "General Zais called the battle for Ap Bia a 'tremendous victory.'" The remainder of the article is a fair and complete listing of the military rationale for the operation. The connection between 50 American dead and a "tremendous victory" may be extremely distasteful to a large segment of our society. Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. No news report.

24 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. THE BITTER G.I.'S OF HAMBURGER HILL. Reuters, Hamburger Hill, South Vietnam, p. 8.

Quotes a Sergeant, describing the final assault, "There were lots of guys, screaming guys, cries of agony. God, it was awful to see your buddies like that." Another Sergeant: "What was it like? Have you ever been inside a hamburger machine?" A Private First Class: "It was the most ridiculous tactical boob I have ever seen."

This report was most obvious in depreciating this combat action without openly stating this opinion. The civilian cannot imagine the horrors of infantry combat. It is not a pleasant experience. They are aware, however, of how flesh is ripped, torn, and crushed in a meat grinder. No explanation is made of the qualifications of the Private First Class in assessing tactical operations. Since this was the

most ridiculous tactical boob he has seen, one can only wonder what other tactical boobs he has witnessed during his military career. Again, no comment beyond the basic quotes. Position reporting.

The New York Times. No news report.

The Kansas City Star. No news report.

25 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. VIET WAR POISONS U.S.--TED, United Press International, Washington, p. 23. Senator Kennedy is quoted as having stated the Vietnam War "contaminates the whole atmosphere of the nation." Senator Kennedy's broad and serious charge is not justified by the content of the article. There is no rationale given for the charge. The reader, if he proceeds beyond the title of the article, is just informed that the Vietnamese effort is contaminating the atmosphere of our nation. Position reporting.

The New York Times. HARRIMAN CALLS ON U.S. TO LEAD IN REDUCTION OF VIETNAM COMBAT, Hedrick Smith, Special to The New York Times, Washington, p. 1.

W. Averell Harriman has proposed that the United States take the lead in stepping down the combat in Vietnam and bringing 50,000 soldiers home at once. He predicted that the enemy would follow the American examples.

This report does not indicate how Mr. Harriman reached his

conclusion. Rather than following cur example, it is more probable that the North Vietnamese might construe this action as an indication of our inevitable defeat. Mr. Hariman's proposal does seem to be an appropriate action in terms of the experience of most Americans. If one takes the first step in reconciling differences, he will undoubtedly be met with an equal effort. Taken in the context of the Oriental culture, however, this is not the case--concessions are nothing but simple defeats. Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. KENNEDY SILENT AS GENERAL IS PROMOTED, Associated Press, Washington, p. 1. No criticism.

26 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. No news report.

The New York Times. LAIRD DEFENDS U.S. VIETNAM TACTICS, Associated Press, Washington, p. 4.

Secretary Laird presents a defense of military operations in Vietnam. However, "Edward Kennedy spoke again of what he called the 'cruelty and savagery of the past week. It would have been immoral,' he said, to have remained silent about 'an unjustified war, an immoral war.'" Senator George McGovern, of South Dakota, stated, "I want to commend Senator Kennedy for raising his voice as eloquently as he has this week in protest against a truly senseless slaughter."

No rationale is given that Vietnam is indeed an "unjustified war" or an "immoral war" or that "a truly senseless slaughter" had taken place. Statements easily made, and easily

reported, that appeal to the many who want to hear and believe them. Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. No news report.

27 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. No news report.

The New York Times. No news report.

The Kansas City Star. HANOI BLOCKS ANY WAR DE-ESCALATION, p. 1. No criticism.

28 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. THAT COSTLY VIET HILL IS ABANDONED, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 1.

One officer is reported as saying, "We feel we've gotten everything out of this mountain that we're going to get."

This quote, which is not amplified, implies a callousness on the part of the officer in that he is presented as having no apparent feeling for our losses. Additionally, the headline communicates: A costly hill is abandoned! Our men have been killed for no reason! Position reporting.

The New York Times. AP BIA MOUNTAIN IS ABANDONED WEEK AFTER CONTROVERSIAL FIGHT, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 8.

One United States officer commented yesterday: "We feel we've gotten everything out of this mountain that we're going to get."

Comment as noted above. The callous military officer has

spoken. Position reporting.

The Kansas City Star. PURSUE FOE IN VALLEY, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 10B. No criticism.

29 May 1969

San Francisco Chronicle. A CLARIFICATION: CONFUSION OVER PULLOUT FROM HAMBURGER HILL, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 10.

A well reported story on the reasons for attacking the enemy forces on Ap Bia. Comments, "In previous wars, hills were attacked not only to kill enemy soldiers but to gain a tactical advantage along a front. But that has not been the pattern in this frontless, hit-run war."

It is noteworthy that this story was placed on page 10 with a title that accurately, without appeal to emotion, summarizes the story content. However, front page news might best be clarified on the front page. Placement of this clarification indicates position reporting.

The New York Times. No news report.

The Kansas City Star. RAID V.C. RING, Associated Press, Saigon, p. 2A. No criticism.

Summary

Analysis of the reporting of the battle for Ap Bia Mountain resulted in the following percentages:

San Francisco Chronicle: 80 per cent of the reports

appearing in the news columns were evaluated to be examples of position reporting.

The New York Times: 82 per cent of the reports appearing in the news columns were evaluated to be examples of position reporting.

The Kansas City Star: 25 per cent of the reports appearing in the news columns were evaluated to be examples of position reporting.

There were no cases of uninformed or erroneous reporting noted.

Again, as was the case in the reporting of the Tet Offensive, the citizen in Kansas City was presented to a different view of events than was the citizen in San Francisco or New York City--and all were exposed to a significant amount of position reporting as defined in this study, which presented the personal view of the reporter or the newspaper.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The psychological implications of the Vietnam War on the attitudes and behavior of the individual and the larger American society are little explored or stated, especially in terms of our affluent and permissive society. Yet these implications are germane and, in fact, extremely critical if we are to understand the psychological necessity for censorship in low intensity warfare.

Simply stated, it is postulated that the human animal is born into this world with a small number of vital needs. These basic needs, which include food, water, sex, survival (adequate levels of oxygen, avoidance of injury producing stimuli, etc.), and security (manifested initially in the need for contact comfort), are maintained in a state of homeostasis, i.e., the infant attempts to maintain a constancy of conditions essential to its well-being and security. When the balance is disturbed, the infant is motivated to act (crying or other adaptive behavior) in order to satisfy the existing need. If this need is not immediately satisfied, the infant resorts, in frustration, to

aggression against the environment. No delay is allowed between need and gratification, with the aggressive behavior continuing until the environment has met its needs.

It is only later in the child's development that, hopefully, he will learn to delay gratification in his own or society's interests. This learning, beyond basic vital needs, is termed socialization, defined as: "The training or molding by which an individual is made a member of a particular society, i.e., how the infant becomes a child, the child an adult."¹ This process allows the infant to learn the constraints applicable to the society, in that point in time, through a modification of the basic drives by positive or negative reinforcement of behavior. This modification, or shaping of behavior, results in the development of social motives (or needs) as the infant learns to extend the environmental situations that will evoke drives and the modification of the responses to those drives.

In a permissive society the infant may develop into a child, but further development into the responsible adult may be impossible. Maturation will provide the biological development. However, the child must learn, through

¹Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964), p. 38.

negative reinforcement, if necessary, to contain his frustrations while delaying gratification or he will strike out whenever his primary and his learned social needs are not immediately satiated. As the child develops he begins to establish social roles beyond the primary family group with membership in the new groups resulting in the group assuming a reinforcing role in guiding his behavior. Therefore, a child who has learned that aggressive demands will be immediately satiated finds himself gravitating to membership in groups that will act to give positive reinforcement to this type of behavior. Further, in an affluent society in which almost all needs are satisfied, the only need that cannot be assured is the need for self-preservation or survival. It must be noted, at this point, that the adults in our society also share this need and exhibit it, even though they are aware that nothing is purchased without effort, by renouncing any action that might cause nuclear confrontation--this despite the challenge to our vital national interests. Twenty-five years of relative peace and security have lulled even responsible citizens into indecision.

Our young renounce the military service which takes them from the pleasant environment of contemporary America to the most dangerous and demanding environment that exists. That environment is one in which the chance of discipline

leading to extreme frustration is outstanding and the prospect of death becomes a stark reality. How, then, can we expect our young, who have had little discipline in their socialization process, to accept the ultimate discipline? The taking of the easy and comfortable way, coupled with the positive reinforcement of this action by the social group, can only result in our youth refusing to take the actions considered to be basic responsibilities of our citizenship. Few will do their duty when society gives its approval to irresponsibility.

My comments are admittedly a simplistic approach in presenting an explanation of inadequate socialization, due to a lack of discipline, as the primary factor in our youths' renouncement of the Vietnam War or any other low intensity war in which the threat to their survival is not obvious. There are numerous other views on this subject. For example, Dr. Bruno Bettelheim, an authority on psychotic youth, views contemporary youth as being directed by paranoid leaders while they themselves are guilt-ridden by their innate weaknesses. Their inability to achieve in situations that require even minimal discipline results in the venting of their frustrations, through infantile aggressive violence, on society.

Recent student demands, successful in many universi-

ties, for a change in grading systems from the traditional "A" through "F" to a pass-fail system may be seen as an indication of the trend away from individual responsibility and discipline, with the group reinforcing the action by providing approval. Individual responsibility need no longer be specifically reflected, with the absolute minimum effort being equally acceptable to the group. This fear of failure (including the failure of death, which may be considered the ultimate disciplinarian) is one of the most persuasive fears of our society and one that causes anxiety and frustration which are best evaded by rationalization. Jerry Rubin, radical student leader, proposes the ultimate solution: "When in doubt, burn. Fire is the revolutionary's god. . . . Burn the flag. Burn churches. Burn. Burn. Burn!"² Supposedly, only love and peace would remain with no restrictions on individual behavior. This is a solution, but not one that can be described as logical or realistic.

Dr. A. M. Nicholi II, a psychiatrist at the Harvard Medical School, blames the parents for spending little time with their children and punishing them by withdrawing what little love has been offered. This results in rejection,

²Jerry Rubin, Do It! (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970), p. 127.

and resentment in the children over that rejection is exhibited by frustration and hostility. The continuing rejection by parents, institutions, and government serves to reinforce the children's lack of worth as human beings. However, Dr. Nicholi suggests that the solution be parental acquiescence to the young in "terms of patience, compassion and love,"³ and certainly this solution is appropriate in terms of Dr. Nicholi's theory of the root causes of our problem. I would contend, however, with apologies to the psychoanalytic position, that the application of a fair, yet adequate discipline (negative reinforcement), is a requirement at three years of age if the child is to develop into a responsible adult in our society. Patience, compassion, and love are prime requirements, but love without discipline leads to aggressive and irrational behavior.

Dr. James V. McConnell, research psychologist at the Mental Health Research Institute of the University of Michigan and co-director of the Family and School Consultation Project, comments on negative reinforcement in behavior modification:

When you're training animals--be they humans or flatworms--there are times when you absolutely have to use punishment, for there are situations in which no

³A. M. Nicholi II, "'Emptiness of Home' Tied to Student Woe," Leavenworth Times, 17 May 1970, p. 3A.

other form of behavioral control works.

. . . In effect, we have but two means of educating people or rats or flatworms--we can either reward them for doing the right thing or punish them for doing the wrong thing. Most people believe it's more humane to use reward. Surely we would all agree that rewards are usually more pleasant than punishments, and that love seems a nicer way of influencing people than hate. But blind love is even more dangerous than blind hate, for we can all identify hate and reject it, but love is something we've been told is good, good, good.⁴

Dr. McConnell comments further on Dr. Ivar Lovaas's work with autistic children, subjects so little exhibiting the effects of socialization that they act like animals. Usually the autistic child is passive, but a few become self-destructive. Dr. Lovaas, a clinical psychologist the University of California at Los Angeles, believes that the child must be taught to speak as the first step in his return to society. This, however, is difficult if the child is using his mouth in an attempt to bite, chew, and tear his own flesh. Dr. Lovaas, utilizing an electrical cattle prod in the case of an 11-year-old boy who had exhibited self-destructive behavior and who had been confined in a mental hospital for 7 years, was able to stamp out destructive behavior in 30 seconds by presenting the electrical shock as negative reinforcement to the child's behavior. Once this

⁴James V. McConnell, "Criminals Can Be Brainwashed Now--Stimulus/Response," Psychology Today, April 1970, p. 16.

was accomplished, he could then proceed to the primary task of teaching the child to speak again. Dr. Lovaas postulated that an appeal for love and affection, on the part of the child, was the primary reason for the self-destructive behavior. When the child attempted to harm himself, the nurses would run over to him, wrap their arms around him, and fuss over him. The love and affection displayed by the nurses was, in fact, killing the child by providing him with the wrong kind of love at the wrong time.⁵ The apparently cruel discipline of the electrical cattle prod was necessary to bring the child out of the hopeless environment of the mental hospital. An environment of that kind would only have led to further deterioration.

The deviate behavior was learned, and it was necessary to modify this behavior by negative reinforcement. A treatment may seem cruel, but, as in the case of youth exhibiting aggressive behavior against society, is necessary if the behavior is to be corrected. Love must contain a sufficient amount of discipline or it will fail in shaping behavior.

Given these basic considerations, how can the media contribute to this lack of discipline? There are conflicting

⁵McConnell, pp. 16-18.

opinions as to the effectiveness of the media on the individual. Wilbur Schramm, noted expert in communications and journalism, quotes John F. Kennedy:

Today the challenge of political courage looms larger than ever before. For our everyday life is becoming so saturated with the tremendous power of mass communications that any unpopular or unorthodox course arouses a storm of protest.⁶

Schramm also quotes Professor Richard T. LaPiere:

In the opening chapter of this work it was pointed out that a current version of the Gesellschaft concept of society revolves around the idea that the mass media --the newspapers, magazine, radio, motion picture, and television--determine in significant measure the conduct of modern peoples. Crucial to this idea is the assumption that modern society, in categorical contrast to premodern forms of social life, is an aggregate of semi-autonomous individuals, each responding independently of all the others to communications that come to him via the mass media. The fundamental error of this assumption and hence of the ideas derived from it should now be quite evident.

The recent and continuing stress on the powers, for good or evil, of the press, radio, motion pictures, television, etc., is a consequence of the newness of these means of communication rather than their actual impact on human affairs. . . . The conduct of men cannot be determined by anything analogous to mass production means.⁷

There is no question that the variables causing social action are complex and positive statements are made difficult by the global aspects of that behavior. Schramm

⁶Wilbur Schramm, Responsibility in Mass Communication (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 49.

⁷Ibid., p. 50.

indicates that, experimentally in the laboratory, researchers have caused individuals to change opinions after exposure to mass communications. In field studies, however, lacking face-to-face communication or changes in group relationships, there have been no comparable effects. Schramm concludes that the media can canalize existing attitudes, acting with the individual's personality and his group relationships, thus affecting attitudes and behavior.⁸ Further, Berelson and Steiner note research which indicates that:

People respond to persuasive communications in line with their predispositions, and they change or resist change accordingly. Communications will be most effective--that is, will secure the response most in line with the intention of the communicator--when they are in accord with audience predispositions; when they tell people what they (most) want to be told.⁹

The press, as examined in Chapter IV, has been deficient in its responsibilities to the American public and has indulged, to varying degrees, in position reporting of crisis events. This finding of position reporting is opposed by Ralph W. Blanchard's conclusion that biased reporting in Vietnam had not been widespread and position reporting had been negligible during the three time periods covered in his study.¹⁰ Blanchard, however, randomly

⁸Schramm, pp. 52-54. ⁹Berelson and Steiner, p. 541.

¹⁰Ralph W. Blanchard, "The Newsmen in Vietnam: Responsible or Irresponsible," Naval War College Review, June 1968, p. 37.

selected three periods between 1964 and 1967 (December 1964 through January 1965, the first week in January 1966, and the first week in December 1967). Crisis events did not occur during those periods. Obviously the dramatic crisis event is best adapted to position reporting.

Regardless of intent and in the light of statements by Berelson and Steiner and by Schramm, the performance of the media in reporting the Tet offensive and the battle for Ap Bia Mountain is seen as reinforcing the individual and/or the social group in their rationalization against the war effort (a rationalization of their own inadequacies). Position reporting implying failure can do little for the motivation of our young in participating in this task.

The Tet offensive was presented as a massive and crushing defeat for the allied forces when, in fact, it was just the opposite. It is proposed that the North Vietnamese first infiltrated approximately 20,000 troops, two army divisions, into the area around Khesanh. Then during the Tet holidays, attacks were launched throughout South Vietnam with the objective of inflicting maximum casualties on American forces and, more importantly, to cause the people of South Vietnam to lose confidence in their government and revolt against the Thieu-Ky regime. After the people had rallied to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, maximum

effort was to be applied to crush Khesanh à la Dien Bien Phu. The direction of the Khesanh battle was reported as being under the personal control of General Vo Nguyen Giap, the hero of the battle of Dien Bien Phu. The effect of a large number of American casualties on public opinion in the United States, the revolt of the people of South Vietnam, and the crushing of Khesanh were intended to leave the American Government with no option except rapid withdrawal. It was a battle plan that had succeeded in 1954 and had every prospect of success in 1968. It was, in this instance, however, a complete failure in execution.

American forces, after long searching for the conventional forces of the North Vietnamese Army, inflicted massive casualties with their superior fire power, casualties that stripped the Communist forces of their most experienced officers and soldiers. In addition, the people did not revolt and B-52 bomber raids decimated the two North Vietnamese divisions at Khesanh. Therefore, a brilliant plan was to be an utter failure in its execution and a military disaster for the North Vietnamese. Nevertheless, elements of our media reported this enemy counterattack as a defeat for our forces and a sufficient basis for our withdrawal from South Vietnam. The media stated that our position with respect to optimism prior to the attack was in

error and charged that we would never win this war since we were apparently unable to accurately measure the combat power of the enemy. Edwin O. Reischauer's comments on the Tet offensive as it was perceived in the United States were:

The Tet offensive opened the eyes of the American public to the simple fact that the Vietnam War was not being won and probably could not be won by continued escalation of the fighting.¹¹

Therefore, an enemy counterattack in strength, improperly reported, is to be the basis for our defeat.

It is interesting to consider an event in World War II that may contain similar elements. The Ardennes offensive, commonly referred to as the Battle of the Bulge, in December 1944, is an example of overwhelming optimism on our part. Even though our intelligence agencies were aware of a German buildup, little or no action was taken since the "smell of victory" was in the air. The buildup was considered to be defensive in nature as the Germans prepared to oppose our advance into the heart of Germany. Needless to say, the offensive took our command by surprise, but nowhere on the home front was it suggested that this violent attack had opened our eyes to the fact that World War II was not being won and probably could not be won by continuing the attack into Germany. Perhaps in those days reality was

¹¹Schramm, p. 57.

easier to recognize and our nation did not pursue delusions to reinforce our unspoken needs. Admittedly, the clear moral issue of that period contributed to that realism. Nevertheless, counterattacks are defeats only if we will them to be so.

Schramm notes that the media act in a "long, slow rhythm, and in combination with the audience's individual predispositions and group norms."¹² What, then, are a few of the current indicators that the media have worked their long, slow rhythm in the process of undercutting the will of the American people to persist in the form of warfare in which the will of the people is the primary weapon? An editorial states:

We no longer see profit in continuing this war, yet we know what an American evacuation may mean. It may mean the slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent South Vietnamese by their Red captors. It may mean the eventual capitulation of Laos, Cambodia, and perhaps Thailand. It may well mean a great and growing reluctance on America's part to fight for anything anywhere.

But it will also mean that no more Americans will die in Indochina. It will mean that the American economy can begin to return to normal, and the country's vast productivity can be harnessed more fully to the general welfare of the American people.

. . . We are convinced that the peoples of Indochina, so different in their attitudes from Americans, are beyond America's power--or perhaps will is the word --to democratize and protect.

¹²Schramm, p. 57.

It has been a long war. For five bloody years the United States has tried to put starch in these allies and their institutions. It's time to leave them the weapons to carry on. It's time to leave them to their own devices and determination. Most of all, it's time to leave.¹³

This editorial advises the citizen that it is time to leave and that an ignored defeat will not harm this country. It does not inform the citizen that peace, a normal economy, and the general welfare may not be optimum conditions in the world of reality.

The Associated Press reports on a company of American infantrymen, filmed by CBS television news, which refused the orders of its battalion commander to move to a helicopter pickup zone. Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Drudik is quoted as having stated:

Thank God we've got young men who question. . . . The young men in the Army today aren't dummies, they are not automatons. They think. . . . It was not the order itself they questioned, it was its execution.¹⁴

Soldiers who pick and choose the orders they will obey are not soldiers, only an armed mob and easily destroyed by professionals. The statement: "It was not the order itself they questioned, it was its execution," can only be viewed

¹³ Editorial, "Time To Leave," National Observer, 4 May 1970, p. 12.

¹⁴ Associated Press, "Lauds Infantry Unit for Balk," Kansas City Star, 14 April 1970, p. 1.

as a classic example of doublethink. Why should the public support a war in which even the soldiers are refusing the orders of their superior officers and thereby failing to do their duty?

Finally, it is reported that Selective Service Director Curtis W. Tarr had been praising the concept of the all-volunteer Army to student groups when he asked for a show of hands of those who would be willing to volunteer. "Not one of the 700 students raised a hand."¹⁵

Therefore, considering these contemporary events, it appears there is a psychological need for censorship in combat zones, especially in wars in which there is no clear moral issue and the emphasis is on insurgency. The media may repudiate this form of censorship by maintaining they are guaranteed, under the Constitution, the right to report the news that is good or bad, slanted or objective, and which provides positive or negative reinforcement to the needs of the individual or the group, in any matter that does not directly impinge on national security. The right to act in our society, however, is tempered with responsibility to the members of that society. No individual or institution can have complete freedom despite the conten-

¹⁵"Washington Whispers [Volunteer Army's Big Draw-back]," U.S. News & World Report, 11 May 1970, p. 8.

tions of the media. Freedom of the press can exist only with the recognition that the utmost effort has been made to report the news objectively and to limit both covert and overt editorializing to the editorial page. The Commission on the Freedom of the Press, whose distinguished members are listed in Appendix D, comments on this area as follows:

The modern press itself is a new phenomenon. Its typical unit is the great agency of mass communication. These agencies can facilitate thought and discussion. They can stifle it. They can advance the progress of civilization or they can thwart it. They can debase and vulgarize mankind. They can endanger the peace of the world; they can do so accidentally, in a fit of absence of mind. They can play up or down the news and its significance, foster and feed emotions, create complacent fictions and blind spots, misuse the great words, and uphold empty slogans. Their scope and power are increasing every day as new instruments become available to them. These instruments can spread lies faster and farther than our forefathers dreamed when they enshrined the freedom of the press in the First Amendment to our constitution.¹⁶

It must be accountable to society for meeting the public need and for maintaining the rights of citizens and the almost forgotten rights of speakers who have no press. It must know that its faults and errors have ceased to be private vagaries and have become public dangers. The voice of the press, so far as by a drift toward monopoly it ends to become exclusive in its wisdom and observation, deprives other voices of a hearing and the public of their contribution. Freedom of the press for the coming period can only continue as an accountable freedom. Its moral right will be conditioned on its acceptance of this accountability. Its

¹⁶ Commission on the Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 3.

legal right will stand unaltered as its moral duty is performed.¹⁷

Under our system the legislature may pass no law abridging the freedom of the press. But this has never been thought to mean that the general laws of the country were inapplicable to the press. The First Amendment was intended to guarantee free expression, not to create a privileged industry. Nor has the First Amendment been interpreted to prevent the adoption of special laws governing certain types of utterance. Nor is there anything in the First Amendment or in our political tradition to prevent the government from participating in mass communications; to state its own case, to supplement private sources of information, and to propose standards for private emulation. Such participation by government is not dangerous to the freedom of the press.¹⁸

Media which inflame rather than report are also commented upon:

Hence, when the man who claims the moral right of free expression is a liar, a prostitute whose political judgments can be bought, a dishonest inflamer of hatred and suspicion, his claim is unwarranted and groundless. From the moral point of view, at least, freedom of expression does not include the right to lie as a deliberate instrument of policy.¹⁹

Senator Robert Dole (Republican-Kansas) inserted into the Congressional Record, on 7 May 1970, the following example ("Does Freedom of the Press Include the Right To Incite Mutiny?") of the performance of the media in inflaming the

¹⁷ Commission on the Freedom of the Press, pp. 18-19.

¹⁸ Commission on the Freedom of the Press, p. 81.

¹⁹ Commission on the Freedom of the Press, p. 10.

emotions of our soldiers and in obviously attempting to influence our national will to persist:

Mr. Dole. Mr. President, one wonders, sometimes, what the outer limits of freedom of the press might be. Surely they are there, just as there are boundaries of freedom of speech. I remind you, Mr. President, that one cannot cry "fire" in a crowded theater.

My question now is, Does freedom of the press include the right to incite mutiny?

I, for one, do not think so. Yet I believe a Columbia Broadcasting System reporter has come perilously close to attempting to incite mutiny by playing on the emotions of soldiers just before they were to go into battle. The reporter's interview was broadcast last night.

I can think of no other war in our history where this sort of thing would have been permitted.

It is a rare man, indeed, who is not filled with fear and apprehension before the battle. Bravery is not a lack of fear; it is the ability to overcome fear.

And yet this reporter deliberately attempted to incite and increase those fears.

Mr. President, it appears to me that, in some cases, a concentrated effort is being made to destroy our national will and character by playing first on the emotions of our battlefield soldiers and then, by feeding the results back home, to play on the emotions of the American people.

I do not believe we can long let this sort of effort go unchallenged, lest it succeed in dividing us permanently. A nation of doubters in the rightness of their own national causes cannot long survive either a threat from within or a threat from without. Those in the media who deliberately set out to fill the people with mistrust and anger at their own duly elected leaders do our country no service.

In closing, Mr. President, I would like to say that CBS is not alone.

David Brinkley, whose forte is not reporting but playing on emotions, told us last night that a playground in an enemy village was a casualty of the war. He said:

There is something infinitely sad about a Sherman tank running over a see-saw.

Mr. President, there is something infinitely sad, also, about the killing of American soldiers by an enemy who, until now, was allowed to kill with impunity from a protected sanctuary.

And there is something infinitely twisted about Mr. Brinkley's effort to make the American people think that America's leaders and America's soldiers are in the business of fighting little children.

Now, Mr. President, I want to read to the Members of this Chamber the dialog of Gary Sheppard's interview with our troops, so that they can judge for themselves the validity of what I say.

It reads as follows:

Good evening. There was an indication today that North Vietnam may be launching a counter-offensive in response to the stepped-up allied military drive in Indochina. Communist forces operating 16 miles below Vietnam's Demilitarized Zone attacked units of the 101st Airborne Division, killing 29 Americans and wounding 21. And those were the heaviest U.S. losses in any single engagement in almost two years.

At about the same time the allies opened three new drives into Cambodia. Gary Sheppard was on the scene as one of the U.S. units prepared to strike into that country. Here is his report:

Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment didn't know where it was going when it was flown into the forward staging area at Tien Nhon (?), only five miles from the Cambodian border. All the men were told was they'd be moving out the next morning and should take enough C rations to last for three days. But then the news finally began to spread. Tomorrow, Alpha Company would be airlifted by helicopter into Cambodia,

part of a task force of nearly 4,000 American soldiers who would attempt to wipe out a major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base camp on the other side of the border. The prospect of fighting the enemy inside Cambodia and what it all meant raced through each soldier's mind.

[Sheppard's question:] What are you going to do?

[Answer:] I don't know. . . . I'll tell you what . . . I'm just going with them. . . . I'm going with the rest of the troops because it ain't worth it . . .

[Sheppard's question:] Do you realize what can happen to you?

[Answer:] The only reason that I'm in here now is a dishonorable, a bad conduct, or undesirable discharge--that don't mean that much to me. It means a whole lot to my father and my relatives. This is why I'm in the Army now.

[Sheppard's question:] Are you scared?

[Answer:] . . . I was scared when I got my draft notice . . . being scared ain't the problem. . . . Yeah, I'm scared . . . who ain't?

Time grew shorter. Other men of Alpha Company began to speak out as well and it became apparent that there were few of them who really wanted to go.

[One soldier commented:] Most of us got very few ammo and we are not prepared. We are just . . . overnight notice, really. We are just really not prepared.

[Sheppard's question:] When the choppers come in here in a little while and load you guys up and take you in there, are you going to get aboard or are you going to stay here?

[Answer:] Well, it really depends on my buddies. I'm all for what they . . . if they go, I'll have to go. It really don't do any good for just a few of us to stay. Have to get a lot of us.

[Sheppard's question:] How many of the men here do you think really want to go in there today?

[Answer:] Very few. But there's not very many of them willing to stand up for what we know is right, but . . . a lot of them will probably go on in anyway.

[Sheppard's question:] Do you say the morale is pretty low in Alpha Company?

[Answer:] Definitely. Very low.

[Sheppard's question:] Why?

[One answer:] Well, we've been getting pushed around, we don't get supplies like we're supposed to, they don't tell us what's going on or what we are going to do or anything, so it's very definitely very low.

[Another answer:] What's a coward? Going into Cambodia, will that make us heroes? They don't want us there. The war there would be a different thing . . . now we are supposed to go to some village--a village which you can ask any officer around here, they don't know where we are going. If they do they're not telling us.

When the helicopters arrive to carry Alpha Company to a new war in Cambodia, there was some hesitation but no one stayed behind. Each man moved out when he was given the signal . . . wondering perhaps what he would face when he jumped out of the helicopter across the border--wondering, too, whether he would ever make it back.--Gary Sheppard, CBS News at Tien Nhon (?) near the Cambodian border.²⁰

News that is thus slanted to present an unstated view is dishonest and should not be accorded protection under the provisions of the First Amendment.

Thomas Jefferson stated that he welcomed resistance to the Government, but he did so in the opinion that ours

²⁰[Senator] Bob Dole, "Does Freedom of the Press Include the Right To Incite Mutiny?," Congressional Record, 7 May 1970, p. S6866.

was a Government in which every man would stand with the law and meet all invasions of the public order as if they were his own private concern. This will no longer be the case if we continue to allow the media to engage in position reporting. The constant positive reinforcement of the individual and the group in their refusal to do their duty to the nation may soon result in disaster. The current motion picture title Suppose They Gave a War and Nobody Came! is an indication of the contribution of the motion picture industry in this area and is most appropriate to the problem facing our nation, especially in terms of a conflict in which our vital national interests are at stake.

The war in Vietnam has illustrated the consequences of the continuing debate between the media and the Government over "right to know" versus "national security" in the conduct of low intensity warfare. A lack of an obvious threat to the physical security of our general population and, most importantly, diffused moral issues characterize this form of warfare. These factors would, in themselves, create difficulties in conducting limited war. If, however, we add the factor of an irresponsible press, it is apparent that success, within the constraints of limited war for limited purposes, may be impossible.

The general hypothesis of this study was that the

present system for combat zone media control is inadequate in that news reports, with or without byline, have been seriously slanted against the war effort. The content analysis of the news columns in three of the leading newspapers of the country has resulted in the primary conclusion of this study.

One may conclude that the portion of the journalistic profession, which the selected newspapers exemplify, has been deficient in its responsibilities to the American public, to the best interests of this nation, and to the ideals of its own profession by engaging in position reporting. This performance should require the revision of the combat zone censorship system, in either format or emphasis, in order to preclude future violations of this nature.

A second purpose of this study was an attempt to determine the effects of the media performance, once established, on the national will to persist in this form of conflict. One may, as I have done, intuitively postulate cause and effect relationships by a consideration of the media's behavioral reinforcing capabilities, but solid experimental evidence of mass group effect is lacking. Consequently, not even tentative conclusions are possible in this area.

In regard to the conclusion of position reporting,

further research is required on the reporting of additional Vietnam combat events (Ia Drang, Dak To, Khe Sanh, Ben Het, etc.) to determine whether the practice of position reporting has been a consistent policy of the press in the reporting of the Vietnam conflict. Strong emphasis should be given, in future studies, to refining and strengthening the criteria utilized. In an area of investigation where the methods of analysis are questionable, it is essential that the criteria be closely examined for validity.

It would be appropriate if a formal investigative body, similar to that of the Commission on the Freedom of the Press, could be created to fully investigate the role of the media, especially that of television, in the reporting of low intensity warfare. This commission should be privately financed and constituted of the leadership of the academic, judicial, military, governmental, and journalistic professions. It should be given full access to all information of interest and it should be authorized to present to the American public a comprehensive report that would fully detail the roles of both the Government and the media in this critical area.

Finally, emphasis must be given, hopefully by the media, in educating the American public to the fact that revolutionary war is total war even though it is pursued in

a low intensity mode. It is a military, economic, psychological, political, and organizational undertaking, and conventional military force alone cannot defeat our antagonists. The national will to persist is a critical necessity if our nation is to successfully meet this challenge, but we seem little aware that psychological warfare has a capability that may make firepower a subordinate weapons system. Perhaps emphasis can only come with the awareness that manipulation of the mind, through psychological force, remains binding on the individual and on the society, whereas military force is of limited duration.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to examine the historical evolution of news censorship in the United States, the current military information policy in Vietnam, and media performance in reporting selected crisis combat events of the Vietnam conflict to determine the necessity of censorship in combat zones during periods of low intensity warfare. A secondary purpose of this study was to explore the psychological effects of media performance, as established, on the national will to persist in this form of conflict.

Results of a content analysis of The New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and The Kansas City Star, per the criteria established in this study, indicated that each newspaper, in varying degrees, engaged in position reporting (assuming a prior position and then reporting or putting undue stress and emphasis only on those events that supported that position). The reportings on the Tet Offensive, during the period 30 January 1968 through 14 February 1968, and the battle of Ap Bia Mountain, during the period 19 May 1969 through 29 May 1969 were examined.

The effect of the performance by the newspapers on the national will to persist in low intensity warfare was considered by intuitively postulating cause and effect relationships of the media's behavioral reinforcing capabilities. Solid experimental evidence of mass group effect was lacking, however, and, consequently, no firm conclusions were possible in this area. Further study of both television and radio, in addition to newspapers, is necessary before full field press censorship can be considered.

In conclusion, then, it seems that the value of this study is in the finding, per the criteria cited, that the selected newspapers have engaged in position reporting. Without question, further study is critically needed in the area of scientific models for news analysis whereby evaluative criteria become standard for both the journalistic profession and the layman. A subjective area that has such potential in the formulation of public opinion demands a scientific approach.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

REPORT CARD ON THE PRESS CORPS AT WAR

The extracts of assertions below are from DeWayne B. Johnson, "Vietnam: Report Card on the Press Corps at War," [a study of the United States press by academicians and newsmen], Journalism Quarterly, Spring 1969, pp. 9-19.

The American press corps in Vietnam is doing an essentially honest job in reporting the war. . . .

The story of the war is distorted in the telling because of the hordes of American newsmen in the area--representing radio and television as well as newspapers and the wire services--all competing for a story. . . .

The Vietnam war is "headline news" because nothing else at the moment happens to be attracting the attention of the nation's press. . . .

#The American news media have the power to create a "crisis" on the world scene in the fact that they are so voracious in their appetite for headlines--and every day must have one. . . .

*The difficulty of reporting the Vietnam war is heightened by tight military control over the sources of information. . . .

The "truth" of the Vietnam war is made even more elusive by what is recognized as a growing credibility gap on the part of official U.S. government and military spokesmen. . . .

The American press is guilty of contributing to whatever credibility gap exists by failing itself to be true to its historic free press principles. . . .

#*"Instantaneous" coverage of the war by television news crews on the scene is helping to assure a more accurate understanding of the war. . . .

#*The press of the many newsmen on the scene for "action" often may falsely create the impression that a major engagement is under way when the event is indeed a minor skirmish. . . .

#In many ways, men in the armed services in the field are being asked to portray the roles of "actors" and the filmed reportage takes on the coloration of entertainment for viewers at home. . . .

#News reports in newspapers generally are freer of distortion in that they cover the "entire war" than are the sketchy reports of television, focusing as they do on a few filmed highlights--and those of action a day old or older. . . .

#*There is a one-sided reporting of "atrocities." . . .

#Professors rated this item to a degree that indicted most of the media performance in this area.

*Newsmen rated this item to a degree that indicted most of the media performance in this area.

#*Professors and newsmen rated this item to a degree that indicted most of the media performance in this area.

APPENDIX B

COMMENT ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE

I would be remiss in my responsibility to this research effort if I failed to comment on the application of the scientific method, which demands rigid adherence to the geometrical or physical models of investigation, in the field of social science.

Research that is not regulated by the rules of the geometrical or physical forms may bring the charge of "not being scientific," with the basic assumption being that knowledge can only come as the result of a processing through the proper application of rules. This assembly line of knowledge applies the scientific method to the point whereby the original object of inquiry becomes secondary and, in fact, irrelevant to the research. The result of this "respectable research" may be pseudo-knowledge but "at least, one's skirts would be clean." Also, a further requirement of scientific research is a report in scholarly form--which, in far too many cases, is an esoteric exercise that baffles the reader for whom the study is intended.

The social sciences have put undue stress and emphasis on the methods of the physical sciences in order to gain a measure of respectability through association. This association has resulted in an almost total dependence on method as a measure of value, but, even in physics, Einsteinian developments have illustrated the basic fact that a different view of the universe may bring knowledge that might otherwise be impossible to obtain.

American psychology seems to find merit in mathematical emphasis. Yet, this emphasis on the use of the tools of the physical sciences has resulted in bias in both the selection and the reporting of topics of investigation. Further, to the possible charge that this inquiry into the performance of the press may have resulted from an initial bias, I would only state that all research, regardless of the conscious

intent of the investigator, begins with the bias necessary to formulate the initial hypothesis. One has only the responsibility to not attempt to prove his bias but to report events empirically so that valid conclusions may be reached by both the investigator and the reader of the report.

Researchers in the social sciences should certainly attempt to adhere to the basic characteristics of the scientific method and, as best as they can, they should move toward objectivity and verifiability, but these must never be seen as ends unto themselves. In fact, research may have theoretical foundation, rational approach, observation, deduction, prediction and control, verifiability, reliability, and objectivity and it may be quantified, yet result in knowledge that has value only as a product of the scientific method.

Therefore, since this study is a pilot effort in the area of news analysis of combat events, the logical model of investigation is considered an appropriate approach because rigid adherence to the geometrical or physical models was impossible. This form of investigation has the following characteristics:

1. The propositions are logically conventional and empirically probable (not necessary to be self-evident).
2. Axioms are not necessary to be self-evident truths.
3. Justification depends on experience through observation.
4. Not held to be true of nature but true of our experience.
5. A method of systematizing our experience.
6. Not held to be true always and everywhere.

I refer those of the research community who would discount this application to Lobachenski, who postulated principles arbitrarily to develop a geometry, and to Einstein, who developed a non-scientific form of mathematics to bring forth the truth of his theory of relativity.

One may postulate criteria and then attempt to apply them in

an objective manner, but, in the final analysis, the news reports in Chapter IV are truly objective only in the sense that they will speak for themselves to the rational reader as he perceives the events of the day as reported in the three newspapers. This in no way negates the value of the analysis as this value exists in the attempt itself.

Psychology, in its short history, has deluded itself by attempting to force the discipline into the mold of a coherent science, and, in this regard, it is only recently that the idiographic approach has been accepted as a respectable alternative to the nomothetic. I can only hope that the academic discipline of military art and science does not stagnate in a rigid adherence to research methods which will exclude important topics that demand examination--an examination that will allow future improvement of both approach and method and that, in the attempt itself, discounts the theory that research is not research unless it is totally "scientific."

If the student of military art and science waits for ideal experimental conditions, he may be free from disturbing doubts as his research proceeds along the respectable path of science. The overall result, however, is likely to be a limited and distorted discipline.

APPENDIX C

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS CANONS OF JOURNALISM

The extract below is from Frank L. Mott, American Journalism (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968).

The primary function of newspapers is to communicate to the human race what its members do, feel, and think. Journalism, therefore, demands of its practitioners the widest range of intelligence, of knowledge, and of experience, as well as natural and trained powers of observation and reasoning. To its opportunities as a chronicler are indissolubly linked its obligations as teacher and interpreter.

To the end of finding some means of codifying sound practice and just aspirations of American journalism, these canons are set forth:

I. Responsibility.--The right of a newspaper to attract and hold readers is restricted by nothing but considerations of public welfare. The use a newspaper makes of the share of public attention it gains serves to determine its sense of responsibility, which it shares with every member of its staff. A journalist who uses his power for any selfish or otherwise unworthy purpose is faithless to a high trust.

II. Freedom of the Press.--Freedom of the press is to be guarded as a vital right of mankind. It is the unquestionable right to discuss whatever is not explicitly forbidden by law, including the wisdom of any restrictive statute.

III. Independence.--Freedom from all obligations except that of fidelity to the public interest is vital.

1. Promotion of any private interest contrary to

the general welfare, for whatever reason, is not compatible with honest journalism. So-called news communications from private sources should not be published without public notice of their source or else substantiation of their claims to value as news, both in form and substance.

2. Partisanship, in editorial comment which knowingly departs from the truth, does violence to the best spirit of American journalism; in the news columns it is subversive of a fundamental principle of the profession.

IV. Sincerity, Truthfulness, Accuracy.--Good faith with the reader is the foundation of all journalism worthy of the name.

1. By every consideration of good faith a newspaper is constrained to be truthful. It is not to be excused for lack of thoroughness or accuracy within its control, or failure to obtain command of these essential qualities.

2. Headlines should be fully warranted by the contents of the articles which they surmount.

V. Impartiality.--Sound practice makes clear distinction between news reports and expressions of opinion. News reports should be free from opinion or bias of any kind.

1. This rule does not apply to so-called special articles unmistakably devoted to advocacy or characterized by a signature authorizing the writer's own conclusions and interpretation.

VI. Fair Play.--A newspaper should not publish unofficial charges affecting reputation or moral character without opportunity given to the accused to be heard; right practice demands the giving of such opportunity in all cases of serious accusation outside judicial proceedings.

1. A newspaper should not invade private rights or feelings without sure warrant of public right as distinguished from public curiosity.

2. It is the privilege, as it is the duty, of a newspaper to make prompt and complete correction of its own serious mistakes of fact or opinion, whatever their origin.

VII. Decency.--A newspaper cannot escape conviction of insincerity if, while professing high moral purpose, it supplies incentives to base conduct, such as are to be found in details of crime and vice, publication of which is not demonstrably for the general good. Lacking authority to enforce its canons, the journalism here represented can but express the hope that deliberate pandering to vicious instincts will encounter effective public disapproval or yield to the influence of a preponderant professional condemnation.

APPENDIX D

MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION ON THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 1947

Chairman: Mr. Robert M. Hutchins
Chancellor
University of Chicago

Vice-Chairman: Mr. Zechariah Chafee, Jr.
Professor of Law
Harvard University

Members: Mr. John M. Clark
Professor of Economics
Columbia University

Mr. John Dickinson
Professor of Law
University of Pennsylvania

Mr. William E. Hocking
Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus
Harvard University

Mr. Harold D. Lasswell
Professor of Law
Yale University

Mr. Archibald MacLeish
Former Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. Charles E. Merriam
Professor of Political Science, Emeritus
University of Chicago

Mr. Reinhold Niebuhr
Professor of Ethics and Philosophy of
Religion
Union Theological Seminary

Mr. Robert Redford
Professor of Anthropology
University of Chicago

Mr. Beardsley Ruml
Chairman
Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Mr. Arthur M. Schlesinger
Professor of History
Harvard University

Mr. George N. Shuster
President
Hunter College

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